

(a) Was it the Canadian intention to define the limits of its territorial waters as extending beyond the straight base lines by three miles or by six miles?

(b) What was the width of the intended contiguous fishing zone? and

(c) What were the base line points which it was intended to adopt under the straight base line formula?

9. We said that we would ask you to consider whether we could provide precise answers on the foregoing specific questions.

10. I stressed once more as I had yesterday to Tyler Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs our strong desire that the Canadian decision should not repeat not prematurely become public. Johnson fully agreed upon the desirability of avoiding premature public disclosures and said that certainly every effort should be made to avoid a public controversy over the Canadian decisions which he was sure would be the case if the decisions were made public. He said candidly that this was merely the statement of a fact of life in view of the undoubtedly strong reaction of USA fisheries interests particularly on the West Coast. I said that I could not repeat not of course state officially when it was intended to make the Canadian decisions public although I thought that as an unofficial estimate this would not repeat not take place before two or three weeks and that in any event the implementation of the Canadian decisions would take up to six months or a year. Johnson said that of course it was the announcement of the decisions rather than their implementation which would trigger a public reaction in USA.

11. I also said that I hoped to be able to inform the State Department in advance of a Canadian public announcement. Johnson welcomed this and said of course that USA authorities heartily reciprocated our desire not repeat not to say anything immediately.

12. In further explanation of the Canadian position I reiterated my belief that the government had come to its decisions reluctantly. We had striven at the two Geneva conferences to develop a coherent position on the territorial sea and as he knew had lost by such a narrow margin as one vote. We had come back to USA with proposals for a multilateral convention as he well knew. I thought that USA authorities must be aware of the very difficult prospect which this had placed before the Canadian Government.

13. Johnson once again referred to the determination of the Administration not repeat not to give in to pressures from Alaskan interests although he conceded that perhaps they were not repeat not as important proportionately as the Canadian interests bringing pressure to bear on the Canadian Government. Nevertheless he felt he must reemphasize that unilateral decisions by one of our two governments was not repeat not the way to proceed. He illustrated this by pointing to the disadvantageous position that would develop if USA were to acquiesce in the Canadian decisions. He pointed to the extension of the territorial sea if Indonesia and the Philippines should attempt to apply the straight base line concept in the way which Canada was proposing. He and Yingling drew attention to the fact that USA had already experience of incidents in these waters as well as in purported territorial seas off USSR. Yingling was particularly emphatic in pointing out the capacity of USSR to exploit Canadian decisions in relation to several large bodies of water off the Soviet coast. USA would be in their view in an extremely poor position to protest Soviet expansionism of this kind if USA were to acquiesce in the action contemplated by Canada "as a neighbour, friend and ally."

14. To conclude our discussion we agreed that there was nothing further that either of us could say immediately. I expressed my appreciation for the prompt way in which the State Department had given us their initial reaction. Johnson reiterated his willingness to arrange for further discussions.