

look as though we were not wholly friendly to Japan. I again told him that I had offered the post to Odlum and to Wrong but for reasons that he knew, they were unable to accept. That my real difficulty had been to get a person wholly qualified for the position. I asked him if he would make a suggestion. He replied that naturally it was a domestic affair and he did not wish to do that. I told him I fully understood that but would be glad if there was any name that occurred to him. He spoke of Dr. Keenleyside. My reply was that Dr. Keenleyside was very much needed at headquarters with Dr. Robertson; that, in fact, we were having to take from other offices one or two persons to assist Dr. Robertson. He would appreciate what the loss of both Dr. Skelton and Mr. Christie had meant to our service. The Minister said he fully understood this.

We had some general talk about the war; the possibilities of American and Japanese intervention—all pretty general. I told the Minister that I did not think the U.S. wanted to get into the war but that they certainly felt what was at stake in the cause for which Britain was contending. That I thought they were hoping to do everything possible by way of lending aid as a means of their own defence as well as the defence of democracy; that the time might come when public opinion might compel them to go further. That I did not think either Britain or the U.S. wishes to have any conflict with Japan. I said I thought they both felt it difficult to understand Japan's position in joining with Axis powers. He said that was altogether for purposes of preventing the war spreading over larger areas. That that was really the purpose of the Japanese-Soviet Pact.

I asked him about Mr. Matsuoka's own inclinations, saying I had heard from some sources that he was rather ambitious and aggressive, at any rate seemed to be uncertain as to his intentions. The Minister replied that he knew Matsuoka very well; had been at the League of Nations with him; that he was the last to continue to try to have the [Manchukuo] dispute settled by the League. That while he was a man who might make a display in his utterances, etc., he really was at heart strongly for peace. Yoshizawa, however, felt that while Japan did not want to go to war, situations might arise, because of her obligations to the Axis, which might make it necessary for her to do so.

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After the Minister of Finance had concluded the presentation of his budget, I had all the British Columbia members, both sides, come to my office, Room 401 in the House of Commons. I told them of the interview I had had with the Japanese Minister; what had been said at the interview; what the government had undertaken to do. I outlined to them the situation vis-à-vis Japan as it was developing and as I saw it in the world picture. I read them the three latest communications from McGreer, the one containing the communication left with him by the Deputy Foreign Minister of Japan, and