

in Lizzie's performances in pulling in the board by the two nails. The quickness with which she learned the elements of the trick indicated that she perceived the way in which it might be done by simply inspecting the situation. But we should be cautious in our interpretations, because it was not known how near such actions might have been to her previous experience. Had she, for instance, been used to pulling in branches with fruit attached to them, pulling in the board might have been a particular application of some of her previous activities for which she may have had a strong instinctive bent.

While it may not be safe to deny to Lizzie a certain amount of prevision in her performances with the board, we should hardly be justified in saying that they necessarily involved the drawing of an explicit inference. Should one ask if Lizzie were able to reason, the answer would have to depend on how reason were defined. That some of her acts are the outcome of simple inference, though perhaps not explicitly formulated in her mind, is quite probable. Even perception, as Spencer, Binet, and others have shown, is allied to inference; and Lizzie's behavior evinces a much closer approach to the rational type than does the process of simple perception. Her behavior does not indicate so high a degree of mental development as that of several other monkeys that have been the subject of experiment. Whether her relative ineptitude for certain tasks is an individual peculiarity or a trait char-