From clause 19 on, the bill deals with ministers of state for ministries of state. These ministers will be of the Privy Council; they will be in the Cabinet. Each minister will have as his chief executive officer not a deputy minister but an official to be designated as the secretary to the ministry of state for whatever the appropriate designation of the ministry of state might be. The minister's powers and duties are to be assigned either by Order in Council or by legislation. Indeed, they may be assigned by existing legislation if a minister is to be put in charge of a certain area in respect of which there is existing legislation and for which certain policy decisions and programs are to be undertaken. The minister of state is required, as is any other minister, to make an annual report to Parliament of the work which he performs in his conduct of the ministry.

In addition to the ministers of state in charge of ministries of state, the bill also proposes there shall be other ministers of state who will be of the Privy Council and members of the Cabinet. These ministers will not preside over ministries of state. The intention is to designate such ministers to assist ministers who hold portfolios. Such ministers, who are in a sense assistant ministers or associate ministers, will have access to departmental services and facilities. They will be required to perform such duties as Parliament may prescribe or as worked out with the minister holding the portfolio with whom they will serve. They can, for example, be authorized to deputize for the minister with portfolio in certain cases. I should tell honourable senators that there is no limit set in the bill to the number of such ministers of state who can be appointed. These ministers will have a status somewhat analogous to that of ministers without portfolio, but they have their individual specific duties to perform under the Public Service Rearrangement and Transfer of Duties Act, duties designated pursuant to a statute, or duties prescribed by arrangement with the minister who holds a portfolio.

At this point it might be appropriate for me to make some general comment about the ministries of state. As honourable senators know, in the organization of government at given times departments are set up, ministers are appointed, and their duties are prescribed by statute. I can remember many years ago the existence of a department known as the Department of the Interior. But the problems of government grow and become more complex. For example, the Minister of the Interior was responsible at one stage for Indians and Eskimos, for the north, for energy, mines and technical services, for industry, and for communications. When the problems became too much for one department to deal with, the remedy taken by Parliament was to establish by a bill a new department with all the apparatus of a department. But we live now in an area of fast change, an era of technological advance, research, invention and innovation.

In the United States the cumbersome business of going before Congress to establish new departments has been circumscribed by establishing new agencies of government under executive or presidential decree. Honourable senators will remember the proliferation of such agencies in the days of the New Deal, the so-called alphabetical agencies—the Federal Power Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the like. In this country the Public Service Rearrangement and Transfer of Duties Act was available to shift the load from one portfolio to another. It is now proposed that a minister of state and a ministry of state with limited jurisdiction, with terminable and adjustable functions, with special regard to and attention for urgent work in areas of national importance, should be set up in the manner I have described and as set out in this bill. It seems to me to be the kind of proposal which when used reasonably and responsibly should commend itself to people who like to see the work of government done efficiently. I have confidence that any government in office in this country would have that sense of responsibility.

Honourable senators, I hesitate to embark upon Part VII because it deals with the Public Service Superannuation Act. Without doubt this is the most complicated piece of legislation, next to the Income Tax Act, we have on our statute books. Therefore, rather than attempt to describe what the bill proposes clause by clause—although I have the references here if any one requires them—I propose to set out seven different cases which are dealt with by the bill, and discuss them in a practical way. Generally speaking, what is proposed in these clauses, which begin with clause 27, is that it should be possible to have earlier retirement for members of the Public Service of Canada—that is earlier retirement upon a reasonable pension basis. At the present time the earliest age for retirement under the Public Service Superannuation Act is 60 years, with a certain minimum number of years of service, and without which a pension cannot be granted. It is now sought to provide a facility whereby public servants can retire at an earlier age and still receive pension benefits in certain cases and under certain circumstances.

Case No. 1 covers the situation where a public servant at age 55 and with 30 years of service can retire and receive an immediate annuity based on the length of his service. The best six years of his salary history are taken into account when he retires in these circumstances.

In case No. 2 the present law is restated. It is repeated here simply to make the draftsmanship a little easier. The law now allows a public servant to retire and to take a deferred annuity at age 60 if he has had five years of service in the Public Service of Canada. As I say, that situation prevails at the present time.

Case No. 3 covers the situation of a public servant who has reached the age of 50 and has had at least 25 years in the Public Service of Canada. That person can retire and receive an immediate annuity. The amount of the immediate annuity is the amount of the deferred annuity to which he would have been entitled, less an amount determined by the formula which is in the bill.

I know that sounds like so much gobbledygook. However, I will give honourable senators an example. Let us assume a deferred annuity to which such person would