

*Supply—External Affairs*

for a moment that this is going to be Canadian policy. I am convinced that the people of Canada are not ready to go to war to rescue a colonial power from the follies it has committed; I think the people of Canada are right. Yet, there is not one of us who has not got a feeling of friendship and kinship, and today anxiety for France. We are close to that country. We wish to be close to what is after all the cultural leader of Europe. We have for France the greatest of admiration and friendship, but we are doing France no service and we are doing our own people a disservice if we refrain from saying these things which are honestly upon our minds. For once it appears that the logic of the French has misled them.

We know, and we do admire, the gallantry of those who fought at Dien Bien Phu. Yet need Dien Bien Phu have occurred at all had there been greater wisdom in French policy? And another question is on my mind. Is French concern in Indo-China completely divorced from concern for other areas much nearer continental France? Is that not one of the nubs of this whole situation? If France gets out of Indo-China, what then happens to Tunisia and Morocco? That is a situation which France must face, and face up to very shortly because the people in those areas also want their independence. They also want their freedom. They also want the right to say "we are going to govern ourselves," and France still refuses.

It is conceivable that there are people in this country, and even in the government, who see an advantage in France hanging on to these territories. After all, so long as France has Morocco and Tunisia—well, we will have air bases to use in the event of war. But if the people of these territories have decided that they are going to be free, we shall have no air bases; and, even although we subjugate them, we shall not be free to use those bases.

If we think only in terms of bases in north Africa, surely the obvious thing to do is to make friends of these people. The way for France to make friends with them is to say to them, "In a certain number of years we will give you your freedom and your independence, and during those years we would like to help you. We would like to train your civil service. We would like to train an administration so that it can take over." And then France can leave, with credit and glory; and France can leave friends behind her.

As it is, if France's policy is the same policy she pursued in Indo-China she will leave enemies behind her—and not only for France, but also for the western world. And the Arab bloc will have gained fresh allies.

But there are other aspects of the situation I would like to deal with. This afternoon my leader gave briefly some of the history of Indo-China. I want to bring the matter up to date, and particularly do I wish to refer to an idea given out this afternoon by the hon. member for Prince Albert. There is in many areas a desire to have a pact to restrain Mr. Dulles—I beg your pardon, I mean communist aggression in Asia. And apparently the hon. member for Prince Albert would like to see some sort of Asian counterpart of NATO—a southeast Asian treaty organization. He told us, of course, that it would not operate without Asian nations in it.

Obviously. But what Asian nations did he have in mind? That is a fair question to put to the hon. member. After all, it is quite possible that the Asian nations he has in mind might refer to Formosa—or it could be the Philippines, or it could be South Korea or all of them. These are Asian nations. But I do not think these are the Asian nations the hon. member for Prince Albert had in mind. Perhaps he had in mind India, and other countries of the Colombo group; at least I hope so.

But I submit this to him, that if we are going to wait for the Colombo nations to come into such a pact, we are going to wait long, long years, beyond the span of life of any member in this House of Commons. India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Indonesia, Burma—none of these will have anything to do with such a pact, and for a very good reason. The leader of the Social Credit party said we had to persuade these people to act with us in our great and pressing cause. They are not remotely interested in our great and pressing cause. For all that the people in Asia can see are great and powerful and wealthy nations—wealthy beyond avarice, nations which have something to defend, something to hang on to, something to protect.

But what does Asia have to defend? What do the Asians have to protect? They have a mortality rate whereby the expectancy of life is 27. They have poverty, illiteracy and disease. Is Asia going to fight for these things? No, Asia will fight only for a new social order; and that is the first and the most important thing in the world to Asians today. So why should they see our desire to protect our world as a great and pressing cause? The whole idea is absurd! Asia is going to improve the conditions of its own people before it considers protecting what we have, and what we have been so loath to give up in the past—no matter how noble our protestations have been.