

External Affairs

I submit that the attitude of the government of Great Britain is one of common sense. It does not approach the question having made up its mind prior to any meeting that China cannot be recognized. It is approaching the question hoping for good faith on both sides and as a result of that expression of good faith the recognition of China and admission of China to the United Nations. That is exactly the attitude of the C.C.F. group in this house, although some of our good friends to the right seem to consider that a rather radical suggestion.

I listened most carefully to the minister's explanation of Mr. Dulles' explanation, and while I fully appreciate, and I know the house appreciates, the stand the minister took in the speech he made in Washington, I must admit that when he finished I was just about as foggy as when he started. I am of the opinion that when Mr. Dulles made the first speech he intended to say what he did say and later tried to explain it away. My conviction is somewhat strengthened by reading a speech Mr. Dulles made at the American Legion convention last September which I think clearly indicates the frame of mind with which Mr. Dulles approaches these questions. He addressed the American Legion convention in St. Louis on September 3 last year, and with respect to relations with the world at large he went on to say:

There is much talk these days about the increased responsibility that now devolves upon the United States. That responsibility is a reality . . . we do not now have to be constantly taking international public opinion polls to find out what others want and then doing what it seems will make us popular. Leadership won that way is shabby and fleeting. Our present duty is rather to adhere with increased loyalty to what, in our past, has been tested and found worthy.

Mind you, the past has been one of lack of consultation in these matters with the rest of the world.

For more than a century our conduct and example won for us world-wide respect and prestige. That is the only kind of leadership worth having.

I think these remarks indicate Mr. Dulles' rather independent attitude toward this question of consultation with allies before making statements and important decisions. As far as this group is concerned, we are of the opinion that when Mr. Dulles made that statement he intended to frighten the Soviet union, but all he has done is to frighten most of his allies. We do urge that strong representations be made to indicate the repercussions in this country following a speech such as Mr. Dulles made with respect to massive retaliatory action and so on in case of certain circumstances.

[Mr. Herridge.]

In listening to the minister's speech I was interested to note that he made very slight, if any, reference to article 2 of the Atlantic pact. We have heard a great deal about that in recent years but as far as I am concerned I can see very little action and I strongly second the remarks of the hon. member for Winnipeg North (Mr. Stewart) who, I think, made a most excellent contribution to this debate, particularly on that point. I was particularly interested in listening to Mr. James Minifie's remarks on "Mid-week Review" on February 11, 1954. I thought what he had to say concerning article 2 of the North Atlantic treaty alliance was very fitting so I sent for a copy of the script. I must give the C.B.C. credit. They did not have a copy here and actually sent to New York for it. I got the original script from which I have had a copy made. On that date Mr. Minifie made remarks which I thought were most fitting and which convey in a very few lines the sentiment of a goodly number of people, including the members of this group. He said:

The NATO alliance was originally set up with a very definite restriction, it becoming a purely military organization. This was paragraph II of the North Atlantic treaty, which was inserted by Lester B. Pearson, Canadian secretary for external affairs.

I see the minister shaking his head. Is he denying a good thing?

Mr. Pearson: It was not the act of any one man.

Mr. Herridge: The minister took a leading part in proposing that section, I presume. I continue:

It was heavily supported by the Norwegians, the French and the Dutch. Sentiment in favour of it was so marked at the first council meeting that Mr. Acheson directed that the minutes note that the sense of the house was that paragraph II be taken up at the next meeting. This did not happen. Paragraph II to all intents and purposes became a dead letter. It dealt with political, economic and cultural meshing of the members of the alliance. It was designed by the smaller members of NATO to prevent a feud which they already foresaw. This was the subordination by the most powerful members of the alliance—the United States and the United Kingdom—of everything to the military factor.

The smaller members, and there are twelve of them, were deeply concerned over the peaceful development of the alliance. But this ran counter to the trend of the United States, which was more and more to prevent any sacrifice or delegation of national sovereignty. The ideal of the smaller members could be summed up in the words of Lord Acton, the great historian of two generations past. He said: "The process of civilization depends on transcending nationality," and he added, "The nations aim at power—the world at freedom". This, when you consider the heart of the matter is the basic difficulty which the grand alliance is now