likely to be called upon to assist in putting its decisions into effect. As I have already reminded you, Chapter VII of the Charter furnishes the Security Council with very extensive powers, and all members of the United Nations undertake to accept heavy responsibilities in order that the Security Council can discharge its functions. Article 41 of the Charter provides that the Security Council may decide "what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and may call upon the members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations." Again, Article 43 of the Charter provides that "all Members of the United Nations undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security." Article 45 places Members of the United Nations under an obligation to "hold immediately available national airforce contingents for combined international enforcement action." These provisions of the Charter, if they are put into effect, will constitute a serious limitation upon the national sovereignty of member states. In the case of permanent members of the Security Council, this invasion of national sovereignty is offset by the right of veto, which makes it possible for any permanent member to deny the Security Council at any time the right to use the powers which are given to it in these Articles of the Charter. For non-permanent members, the limitation upon sovereignty is qualified, at least for the two-year period for which they are members of the Council, by their ability to take part in the proceedings of the Council and by their right to combine in such a way as to defeat in the Security Council even such proposals as are supported by all the great powers. For all other members of the United Nations there was originally no qualification whatever upon the power granted to the Security Council to call upon them at will to make their resources available for Security Council action. Again, this appeared to be a matter of particualr hardship to the secondary states which would, in effect, be the ones required to adjust their economies and move their forces in support of Security Council decisions. The difficulty was overcome in part by the addition at San Francisco of Article 44 of the Charter to the following effect:

"When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfilment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member's armed forces."

This Article is supplemented by a provision in Article 47 which requires the Military Staff Committee of the Security Council, which is the military planning body on security measures and is made up of representatives of all permanent members, to associate non-permanent states with it in its work as it deems necessary for the efficient discharge of its responsibilities.

This is only a partial remedy to the problem. At the moment, the question is in abeyance, because no progress whatever has been made towards completing the arrangements by which the Security Council will be provided with military force to carry out its decisions, and in the absence of these arrangements the Security Council is hesitant to make use even of the political and economic sanctions, the measures short of war, with which it is provided. It will become, however, a source of concern to the middle powers immediately the United Nations reaches that stage of development at which it is possible for sanctions to be invoked. The Charter as it now stands will be satisfactory in this respect only if great restraint and consideration is used in regard to any action in which a secondary state must participate.