

finding missions, the voluntary invitations measure would be a helpful but marginal adjunct, offering states an option for the demonstration of their compliance behaviour. *However*, if the CCW review process fails to produce a genuine verification regime revolving around the use of obligatory fact-finding missions, the importance of a voluntary invitation measure would increase a great deal. Although such a measure would *not* replace a true verification regime, it would at least provide an option for those States parties that wished to demonstrate their good faith and their compliance with the terms of the CCW. The willingness of a state to invite, on a voluntary basis, a group of observers to explore a compliance concern would speak well of its commitment to the CCW. This would be a strong confidence building gesture. States that declined to invite observers or experts when requested to do so would risk appearing to be uncooperative (at best). Strong suspicions eventually might be created about non-compliance. Although this does not serve the same purpose as verification, it offers some prospect for encouraging compliance. Although the modalities would have to be worked out in the CCW review process, it would make sense to combine this voluntary invitations measure with a measure creating a consultative commission. A consultative commission could serve as a reasonable forum in which to present concerns about compliance.

#### 16. Voluntary Reports

The "voluntary reports" measure requires States parties to consider, on a voluntary basis, issuing timely reports on the use of land-mines (or related Protocol II devices) in "non-international" or national security and police operations, specifying types and general circumstances of use (including the projected time frame for deployment and removal). In one version of this CBM, the reports would have to conform to a common agreed report format. The reports typically would be directed to a CCW consultative commission or to the CCW Verification Commission.

This CBM could be a central element in an essentially voluntary "supplementary" CBM package focusing only on the use of land-mines in non-international conflict situations or it could be added to either the "basic" or "comprehensive" CBM packages discussed below. For the purposes of this paper, it is