

10. In the course of the negotiations, agreement has been reached that the aggregate quantity of super-toxic lethal chemicals for nonhostile military purposes, produced, diverted from stocks, and otherwise acquired annually, or possessed at any given time, should be minimal. The two sides believe that, in any event, that amount should not exceed one metric ton for any party. A party to the convention producing super-toxic lethal chemicals for nonhostile military purposes should carry out such production at a single specialized facility, the location of which should be declared and the capacity of which should not exceed a fixed limit. Details regarding such a limit are under discussion.

11. The US and the USSR believe that the fulfilment of the obligations assumed under the future convention must be subject to the important requirement of adequate verification. The two sides have continued to search for solutions of issues relating to verification of compliance with the obligations under a future convention. They are in agreement that measures with respect to such verification should be based on a combination of national and international measures. There are, however, important issues relating to international verification measures which remain unresolved.

12. As indicated in their report of 31 July 1979, the two sides believe that international verification measures should include the creation of a Consultative Committee. Specific aspects of the proposed functions of the Committee outlined in that report are the subject of further negotiations.

13. The US and the USSR continue to believe that any party to a convention should have the right on a bilateral basis, or through the Consultative Committee, to request from another party with respect to which suspicions have arisen that it is acting in violation of obligations under the convention, relevant information on the actual state of affairs, as well as to request investigation of the actual state of affairs on site, providing appropriate reasons in support of the necessity of such an investigation. A party may agree to such a request or decide otherwise, providing appropriate explanations.

14. The question of whether this type of on-site investigation, together with other verification measures, would constitute a verification system capable of providing adequate assurance regarding the implementation of a convention remains unresolved.

15. The two sides believe that it is necessary to develop procedures for on-site investigation, including provisions regarding the rights and functions of the inspection personnel, and the rights and functions of the host side. Specific issues in this area are the subject of continuing negotiations.