

of its European policy toward a more realistic acceptance of the need to cooperate with the East in ensuring a durable peace. Internally, there is the opposition of Senator Mansfield and other members of Congress to the traditional postulates of "Atlanticism," and to the maintenance of American forces in Europe. Internationally, the new strategic military balance, the deterioration of American relations with Western Europe, particularly in the economic realm, and the growing difficulties in NATO all prompt a fundamental review of American policy. The Nixon Doctrine and the notion of the "mature partnership" with Western Europe have as their logical corollaries an acceptance of a greater degree of independence in the foreign policy of the West European allies, a reduction in the American conventional but not necessarily nuclear presence, and a recognition of the utility of a regional as opposed to a bloc-to-bloc policy in Europe.⁵⁴ Similar directions in future American conduct are suggested by the incipient concept of multipolar diplomacy, which reduces the significance of socio-economic and ideological factors in the pursuit of a foreign policy of balance and maneuver.⁵⁵ Moreover, the United States would prefer to deal directly with the Soviet Union on European matters, rather than having to cope with a CSCE.⁵⁶ In effect, Washington might be interested in a stabilizing arrangement with Moscow as a means of reducing the risks and costs of a renegotiation of its relationships with Western Europe. Although the