

instance, the "Hot Line" agreements) while others are not. Amongst this latter category are those measures possessing a predominantly declaratory character. Although the list is comprehensive, it is not intended to be exhaustive. Surveying it, one can see immediately that many international agreements appear to have at least some features that look like Confidence-Building Measures. The point is *not* to claim that they are all unambiguous examples. Rather, it is to show that the CBM concept, in practice, is (and has been) widespread and imbedded in many security-related international agreements:

1. The 1688 Treaty of Munster
As part of the larger "Peace of Westphalia", this treaty called for the effective demilitarization of the east side of the Rhine through the razing of fortresses. This approach imposed disarmament as the French were able to maintain a garrison on the east side of the Rhine (at Philippsburg).
2. The Third Barrier Treaty of 1715
As did the earlier two "barrier treaties", this called for the creation of barrier fortresses in Belgium to protect the United Provinces of the Netherlands against attack from the French. It also provided for the destruction of French fortifications to the south at Liege and Huy. It is worth noting that not all "demilitarization" treaties merit even casual consideration as CBMs. For instance, although the 1774 Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji bears a superficial resemblance to the Barrier Treaties, it was nothing but a thinly veiled preparation for annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by the Russian Empire. The crucial factor in deciding whether or not a treaty could count as a CBM is, I think, the presence of a recognizable concern with allaying fears about adversary intentions.
3. The 1817 Rush-Bagot Agreement
This agreement limited the number of naval vessels on the Great Lakes and eventually contributed to the effective disarmament of the Canadian-American border.
4. The 1856 Treaty of Paris
The Treaty of Paris, amongst other things, neutralized the Black Sea, restricting access to only a limited number of Turkish and Russian naval vessels. This was intended to restrict the opportunities for future military conflicts in the region amongst the major powers.
5. The 1902 Convention Between Chile and the Argentine Republic Respecting the Limitation of Naval Armaments
This treaty bound the signatories to freeze current naval purchases and to reduce their naval forces within a year. It contributed to the alleviation of tensions between the two powers, tensions which had almost erupted in war in 1898.
6. The 1899 and 1907 International Peace Conferences at The Hague
The Declaration Concerning Asphyxiating Gases (Number IV,2) and the Declaration Concerning Expanding Bullets (Number IV,3) of the 1899 Conference can be seen as sponsoring some minimum understanding of adversary intentions as well as offering at least some prospect of more positive relations. In a similar vein, Convention IV (Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land) of the 1907 Conference established a sense of minimum humanitarian expectations about the conduct of land war. While not directly addressing the fear of surprise attack, such an undertaking does address adversary intentions and psychological images. Signatory states, in effect, promised not to act barbarously. Other 1907 Conventions dealing with, for instance, The Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines (VIII), Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War (IX), The Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War (XIII) and The Declaration Prohibiting the Discharge of Projectiles and Explosives from Balloons (XIV) reflect a sim-

