

many places, and be permitted to use discretionary power under unforeseen circumstances, and when His Excellency could not be near to issue Orders to me. I then used the following expressions, "I assure Your Excellency I am a cautious man, I will take especial care that I be not taken, but I cannot bear to have those Ruffian Men beard us in Town without due notice of their approach." His Excellency said "We cannot save the Town; we have not men enough—let us defend our Posts."

Notwithstanding this, I soon after posted a piquet under the command of the Sheriff (Mr. Jarvis) half a mile from the City, on Yonge Street, and gave such instructions, on the spot, as I thought would suffice to guide him during his stay there. On returning to the City Hall and stating this fact to His Excellency, he expressed his disapprobation of my having done so, after the injunction he had laid upon me. A short time after, being then talking with His Excellency, it was reported to me in his presence that the Sheriff and his piquet were taken prisoners, which naturally made His Excellency repeat his disapprobation of my having posted this piquet. It ultimately turned out that the whole rebel force approached, fired on the piquet, and was fired upon in return, so effectually as to drive them back with some loss. It is now universally admitted that but for this Piquet the Rebels would have then entered the Town and set it on Fire, and yet although this Piquet was posted contrary to His Excellency's express order, he stated in his Despatch writteu twelve days after that he sent it out, and thereby prevented the Incendiary Mackenzie setting fire to the City.

From all that has been said it is now believed by many and I think it most probable that the capture of Messrs. Brock and Bellingham, the killing of the Rebel Anderson by Mr. Powell, and the ringing of the Bells on Monday Night, and the fire from the Sheriff's Piquet on Tuesday night, saved the City on each occasion from being set on fire.

About ten o'clock on Tuesday night His Excellency received an anonymous letter assuring him that the Rebels had determined to set fire to the City in several places before next morning, and he in consequence gave me orders to have the arms and ammunition then remaining in the City Hall removed thence to the Parliament House during the night—the Men laying aside their own arms and each carrying four or five muskets through the Streets to the Parliament House, and having delivered them there to return and take another load, and so continue until the whole should be carried up—and after the arms were carried then to carry the ammunition. It appeared to me that thus to transport them during the night was almost impossible—that the disorder and confusion incident to such a movement in the night must be great, and would probably be irreparable; for should the Rebels attack at any time during the operation, and they must have been well and constantly informed of what we were doing, we should be prevented from reuniting, and must be ruined. The men were tired, cold, and most eager to go to their several homes for rest and refreshment—and had they been so employed during that night great numbers would not again have returned. I entreated of His Excellency not to give the Order, but he firmly insisted upon it. I begged of him to give me some time to consider how it could best be done and I continued for some time to show His Excellency the extreme difficulty of so transporting the arms and the ruin that I thought must certainly follow our attempting to remove them in the night.

As my arguments were nearly, and as I thought fruitlessly exhausted, the arrival of Col. MacNab with a reinforcement of Men from the District of Gore was announced,

and I gladly availed myself of their arrival to assure His Excellency that now there was no need to make the effort, and it was not made.

I should have stated that His Excellency's reason for so hastily removing from the Market House was, that should the Town be set Fire to, the Market House, as he thought, could not be saved in the midst of the surrounding Houses, so combustible and so near as many of them were—whereas the Parliament House and the Two adjacent houses were far removed from all danger from other houses.

The next morning, before day, I occupied the Court House with men to protect the block of buildings surrounding the market square, so that the Rebels could not come near that quarter.

During Wednesday, December 6th, the arms and ammunition were removed in waggons and carts, and a portion of the force was sent also—and His Excellency removed with them to the Parliament House. In the afternoon reinforcements arrived in the Traveller Steam Boat from Niagara and more from the District of Gore in the Burlington, and the Town was crowded with men.

Our numbers now seriously embarrassed us. It became imperatively necessary to attack the Rebels the following day, and to do so required an immediate order that some sort of organization for that purpose might be commenced.

I enquired for His Excellency at the Government House, after sunset, and at the Parliament House, and was told at each place that he was soon expected from the Archdeacon's. I waited till near nine—and at length determined to go to him there, and I requested of Mr. Allan and the Solicitor General to accompany me to urge the necessity of the attack on the next day. We called and found His Excellency with the Archdeacon, Mr. Sullivan of the Executive Council, and the Attorney General, and after a very long discussion His Excellency consented that the attack should be made—but with an apparent reluctance which I could not then understand. Just as we were about to rise to depart Mr. Allan said he saw that there was a misunderstanding existing as to who should command—for that from my conversation now it was plain I expected to command—and Col. MacNab had told him during the afternoon that His Excellency had promised him that he should command. I then imputed His Excellency's reserve during the conversation to his consciousness of the injustice he was about to do me in giving the command to the Speaker. For here, let it be observed that I was a Colonel of Militia before Mr. MacNab had any rank in that Force, and he was almost wholly without military knowledge. A long discussion grew out of this statement of Mr. Allan, and from the part borne by the Attorney General I was convinced he had had much to do in bringing about the appointment of Col. MacNab, who, as Mr. Allan stated, proposed to attack the Rebels at three o'clock in the morning—a time which I declare to be such as to render any successful attack impossible—because it was utterly impossible to organize the confused mass of human beings then congregated in the City during night-time, for then it must be done, to be ready to march from the City after one o'clock so as to reach Montgomery's at three. But I declared it to be impossible to induce unorganized men to make a night attack in great numbers, under any circumstances. Such an attempt would have ruined us, for there were many Rebels then in the City waiting only the turning of the scale to declare themselves. A reverse must therefore have been most injurious to us, if not disastrous.

Too much was said at the Archdeacon's to be stated here, but I could not help feeling the strongest indignation at the idea of any man then in the City being appointed to