

A STAFF FOR THE ENGLISH ARMY.

A correspondent of the *Post*, who subscribes himself "A Regimental Officer," calls attention to the constitution of the Staff of the English Army, which he thinks is a weak if not a dangerous element in our Army organization. As is well known, all staff officers on full pay are now taken from the strength of the regimental officers, and the writer contends that the obvious advantages they obtain by joining the Staff are gained at the expense of their regiments, and that a serious loss, inconvenience, and hardship, is sustained in their regiments by first, the Colonel; second, the officers; and third, by the men of their company. By the Colonel, for he loses an efficient officer; by the officers, for they have for years to do among themselves the duties of the absentee; and thirdly, and above all by their men.

However efficient a subaltern officer may be, it is not in the nature of things that he should take the same individual care of, and interest in, each of the men of a company placed temporarily under his charge as does their captain. For the captain, having the company called by his own name, knowing they are his men and known by them, must have the greatest personal interest in the fortunes and career of each—in the marriage of one, in the promotion of another, in the welfare of all: and if he be worth anything, his loss to his company for five years is a serious one. A company changing, as is not unfrequently, the case, very often its subaltern commander must make the men in it feel that, as regards a friend and protector, they are worse off than any other companies of the regiment. As for the officer himself who is a candidate for the Staff, he finds his interest divided between his present duties and his future prospects, and his preparatory studies broken into by numberless duties. Thus his reading degenerates into hard cramming, in the snatches of leave he can obtain, or in the intervals of duties which are now considered irksome hindrances to success. He confuses his mind and weakens his health in a way that may permanently affect his future usefulness on the Staff, by convulsive exertions to reach a certain, or, rather (as his examination will be strictly competitive), an uncertain standard, and the calm study of the various necessary technical subjects becomes exchanged for feverish efforts to obtain marks in them.

The remedy for all this would be to form a Staff Corps for the English Army. For admittance into this corps all those regimental officers at present on the Staff might have the option of joining the Staff Corps, or of returning to their regiments. To augment and keep up the supply of officers admittance to the present Staff College (which has room for so many) might be more freely opened to the Army. All, for instance, who have qualified for entrance this and the past year might have the option of joining, as probationers, the Staff Corps. To ensure a thorough knowledge of regimental duty and interior economy, let officers pass from two to five years in regiments before being allowed to compete for entrance; when entered, at once be posted as probationers of the Staff Corps, and become, till passed out supernumeraries in their regiments. The various posts which the reorganization of the Reserve Forces must produce might be included amongst the Staff Corps appointments. The promotion, always a difficult point in a Staff Corps might be assimilated to those in the Indian Staff Corps.—*Broad Arrow*.

NAPOLEON III. AT SEDAN.

A GRAPHIC AND THRILLING PICTURE BY GENERAL DUCROT.

In General Ducrot's pamphlet on the war we find the following description of the closing scene at Sedan, written by the general himself.

In the interior of Sedan the spectacle was indescribable. The streets, the squares, the gates, were crowded with carts, chariots, cannon—all the paraphernalia and debris of a routed army. Bands of soldiers without rifles or knapsacks flocked in every moment and took shelter in the houses and churches. At the gates of the town the confusion was so fearful that many perished, trodden or crushed to death in their efforts to enter. Through this distracted crowd horsemen and luggage waggons were cutting their way at full gallop, and the few men who still retained the slightest energy appeared only to make use of it in accusations and curses, crying, "We have been betrayed, we have been sold, by the traitors and cowards." It was evident that nothing could be done with men like these. General Ducrot proceeded to the subprefecture where the Emperor then was. Napoleon III. no longer evinced that coldness and impassibility which had been his chief characteristics. It was easy to see that he was under the influence of the most profound sorrow. As soon as he saw the general, he told him that he deeply regretted the nomination by the minister of War of General Wimpffen to the chief command, but having resolved not to thwart in the slightest degree the decisions arrived at in Paris, he had offered no opposition. "The only thing that could have saved us, however," added the Emperor, "was your movement in retreat." Then, referring to facts anterior to the war, he said "Your presentiments respecting the intentions of Prussia, what you reported home relative to her military forces, and to the few means we had of opposing them, was but too true. I ought to have paid greater attention to your warnings and your advice." After these few words the Emperor remained silent. The profound silence which prevailed around the sovereign rendered still more striking and audible the noise from without.

THE AIR WAS ON FIRE;

the shells falling on the roofs and carrying with them huge pieces of masonry into the streets below; the bursting of the projectiles mingled with the roaring of 600 pieces of artillery—a fearful cannonade, which was heard by Prince Frederick Charles as far away at Metz. "I do not understand," said the Emperor to General Ducrot; "why the enemy continues the fire; I have caused the white flag to be hoisted. I hope to obtain an interview with the King of Prussia; perhaps I may be able to secure advantageous conditions for the army." "I have not much confidence in the generosity of our adversaries," replied the General. "At nightfall we might attempt a sortie." His Majesty observed that there existed such fearful disorder; the streets were so thoroughly crowded; the troops were, besides, so demoralized, that he did not entertain the slightest hope of succeeding in such an enterprise. Such an attempt could only result in renewed effusion of blood! The Emperor and a few officers of his suite might probably have succeeded in escaping, favoured by the darkness; but it was useless to think of saving the army, surrounded—it was irrevocably captured. History will decide whether, contrary to military law, Napoleon III,

would have been justified in escaping by flight (which measure would most certainly have been approved and favored), and separating his fate from that of the army, or whether he should, after sharing its dangers have also shared its misfortune. Moreover the King of Prussia having declared that he waged war against the Emperor and not against France, the Emperor being a prisoner, the war should have ceased.

A singular evidence of Oregon's antiquity was taken out of the ground at Tillamook Heads. It appears that some men were grading a road bed, and, when twenty five feet below the surface, one of them exhumed a copper bowie knife over twenty two inches long, two and a half inches wide, by three-eighths of an inch thick. The curiosity was sent to C. Roop, of Dayton, who has it in his museum? Here is another mystery for the oldest inhabitant to explain. The knife is made of the best copper.

CORRESPONDENCE.

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To the Editor of the VOLUNTEER REVIEW.

SIR:—Public attention in Canada seems so much more directed to military matters now, than ever before, that I take the liberty of again drawing your attention and that of your readers to a suggestion which I made some months since through your columns. I refer to the idea of raising regiments in England, for permanent service in Canada. The policy of the Imperial Government in removing the last remnant of the troops from the Upper Provinces has no doubt caused a feeling of bitterness as well as of regret among our people, but perhaps it will teach us self-reliance, and thus do good in the end.

We may just as well make up our minds at once, that we will have to keep up a small permanent military force, not only to repel Fenian raids, and other incursions of that nature, but for the maintenance of the civil power, and to keep the peace in the new and unsettled territories which have been added to the Dominion. Without such a force we cannot expect the country to enjoy prosperity, nor that sense of security in the new Provinces which is so necessary to attract the right class of immigrants, and to keep up the good name which Canada has always enjoyed, for fair dealing with the Indians.

Supposing then that we only maintained a force proportionate to the very small Regular Army kept up by the United States we would require 4000 or 5000 men, say six regiments of Infantry, one of Artillery, and a small force of Mounted Rifles, which scattered over all the different Provinces from the Atlantic to the Pacific, would certainly not be more than would be requisite in time of peace.

The general orders issued last week give the details of the small force which Parliament has given authority to raise as an experiment, and I must say that the Govern-