Dominion, that dissentient judgments are pronounced and are reported *in extenso.* It is because we think the adoption of such a practice of very questionable advantage that we now draw attention to this subject.

In the Supreme Court of the United States, it is not the custom to report any opinion given by the dissenting judges. The fact that such and such a judge dissents is mentioned and no more. In many of the separate States the same practice obtains as to the decisions of the Supreme Court of the particular State. The opinion of the Court is prepared and pronounced by one judge, appointed in conference by the others, and this limitation has a great influence on the care and precision with which the judgment of the Court is formulated. The principle underlying the whole matter is, as a contemporary expresses it, that a final tribunal should give forth no uncertain sound as to the law, and the publication of conflicting judgments can only tend to weaken the authority of the rule laid, down, and so to perpetuate uncertainty and to increase litigation.

It is evident that one good end which would result from the suppression of dissentient opinions would be the reduction in bulk to that extent of the yearly volumes of the Reports. A very much over-ruled judge might then imitate the example of the Pennsylvania justice, who published at his own charges, in a volume by themselves, his own dissenting judgments, and so sought redress at the hands of posterity. It is further evident that if the reporters do their duty, and give a proper synopsis of the arguments of the opposing counsel, it is unnecessary to set forth the grounds of dissent on the part of any of the judges. Any attentive student of the case will see where doubts may arise. But when a judge has fully combatted his brethren in the conference room, and been voted down, it is better that his reasons for withholding assent, should not be reported, so as to cast disrespect on the considered judgment of Courts of last resort. We think we speak advisedly when we say that the little weight possessed by decisions of Lower Canada Courts is partly owing to the diverse views entertained and expressed by the different judges who take part in the disposition of the case. Much better to suppress the disagreement and not to give prominence to it by publishing *in extenso* all that can be said against the opinion of the majority. As in family matters, if there be disturbances, better not aggravate the trouble by taking the public into your confidence. When Mr. Justice Maule, according to the well-known story, gave judgment, after Judge A, and Judge B, had just delivered conflicting opinions, by saying that he agreed with his brother B, for the reasons given by his brother A, he never intended that the views of the Court should be published for the benefit of the profession, or the confusion of suitors.

The object of all decisions is to settle the law—to determine the just rule fitted to the existing state of things, and it is most important that the conclusion should be reached with such precision and unanimity, as not to provoke litigation. In the Court of final appeal for this Dominion, we think that the ancient customs of the Privy Council, and the well-considered practice of the Supreme Court of the United States, may well be recognised and adopted. The opinion of the Court should be composed and delivered by one member and no dissenting judgment should be pronounced or reported. When Chief-Justice Marshall presided in the Supreme Court, one finds the formula adopted in pronouncing the opinion of the Court thus, as in