## THE DUALISTIC CONCEPTION OF NATURE.

In this use of quois there is already implied the idea of some quality in a thing that makes it what it is, and cannot therefore be altered without the thing ceasing to be. In other words, the nature of things is conceived to be determined by the very power which makes them what they are, and thus to be independent of human will. Accordingly those phenomena, which are products of nature, come to be contrasted as unalterable with those which, being products of man, can be altered or abolished at any time by his efforts. This contrast had already become a familiar commonplace to the Athenians in the second half of the fifth century B. C.; as a result of the primitive philosophical movements of the preceding century. In the speculations of Sophist and Socratic alike the antithesis is quite marked between quotes on the one hand, and vouos or Stores or vigon on the other. In fact the great problem of that period was to find out whether the principles of man's moral life are based upon distinctions in nature, or are merely regulations of human onactment, institutions of human society, artifices of human ingenuity.

But along with this idea of nature being unaltenable there runs the idea of its unity. The one fact indeed is made the corollary of the other. The essential nature of things is conceived to be unchangeable just because all their phenomenal changes are supposed to be temporary modifications of some principle which remains for ever the same. To find this principle was; from the outset, the problem of all scientific inquiry. In the language of early Ionic thought this principle came to be spoken of as  $d\rho_{2}\eta_{1}$ , at least from the time of Anaximander who is said to have first used the term in its philosophical signification.

Among the Ionics monism was thus implicitly assumed. But it became an explicit feature of speculative thought among the Pythagoreans, who may thus be regarded as the first true monists. The monad indeed became with them the dopy of all things; and that in a far more rigid sense than with Leibnitz. For the Pythagorean monad is really nothing but the abstract idea of unity,—the abstract unity whose repetition constitutes all number, and constitutes thus also the very essence of all things.

383