

with guilt because Adam acted as our "Federal Representative;" because, in any sense applicable to this argument, such a representative is simply a fiction. In truth, the charge of guilt for an act without personal existence, or of guilt for the act of a representative that we never elected, or of guilt for a state transmitted to us by a natural law, are all, in one sense, equally absurd, because in any, or in all, we have no moral control. The mind that can declare guilty for those, so-called, acts of humanity, or for that necessary moral state, may be capable of judgments still more surprising, but of none more absurd than that.

But still, on this point of guilt we are plied with the question:—"Are we not guilty for our moral state as well as for our moral act?" The terms of this question, as related to man's naturally depraved condition, are ambiguous, and in order to develop the fallacy wrapped up in them, I reply, Yes, and No. Yes, if the meaning is that we are guilty for continuance of that transmitted depraved state. And again I reply, Yes, if the phrase "moral state" refers to a state of necessary depravity, which may be superinduced by the persistent abuse of our free power. But I reply, No, if the phrase "moral state" refers to our moral state, as transmitted to us. And again I reply, No, we are not guilty for our natural "moral state," as we are for our "moral act;" because, from that moral state we had no freedom, but from our moral act we had freedom. In short, for the reign of sin in us we are guilty, for perpetuity in sin we are guilty, and for