

opposed to each other on that day, had described the ground and detailed the events of the action the same. The comment which it is said the late King of Prussia made on this was, " that there needed no other proof of their " being both correct."

The fact is, that it would have been scarcely possible for General Washington to have gained any advantage that day (as he had put three defiles between his main army and General Lee's corps) unless, as General Lee says, " depending on the ungovernable impetuosity of the British; their rear " guard, which was all that had been engaged, had passed the third defile " and attacked General Washington's whole army, which I find, however, " by General Clinton's letter to Lord G. Germaine, he saw the impropriety " and danger of, and had no idea of doing." 'Tis true, however, that, from Sir H. Clinton's having been obliged to maintain the ground on his side the third defile till certain of the light troops (whose zeal and ardour had carried them much farther than was intended) had returned, the enemy might have hoped that Sir H. Clinton intended to attempt the passage of the third defile.

Mr. Stedman, after giving every merited credit to operations under those respectable officers, General Prevost and Sir A. Campbell in the Floridas and Carolina, and General Matthews and Sir G. Collier in the Chesapeake, in a note, page 134, vol. ii. says, " The Campaign in the northern parts of " America was spent in desultory operations." Surely that Gentleman might have known, that all those desultory movements were necessary precludes to others more solid, which could not be carried into execution for want of promised and adequate reinforcement; nor did he know, perhaps, that Admiral Arbuthnot, whom Sir. H. Clinton had been assured would sail in March with the reinforcement, did not sail till July, or arrive in America till the end of August; or that the Admiral brought in his fleet a jail fever,