

a certainty, have two candidates, one of whom will have drawn his support from one party, the other of whom will have drawn his support from the other party, and they will each look for further support to the political party organization with which they have been associated. As a result of a system based on this resolution you must get in the Senate party men. I do not think there is any escape from that conclusion. If you want to get a Senate with the least partyism in it, keep the appointive power. I do not say you will get a stronger Senate in that way, but by reason of the diminution of party strife and party principles due to freedom from future elections, the senators being in that House for the remainder of their life, and not having to cultivate party affiliations in order to make ready for the day when they shall have to account to the people and ask for another term of power, you will get a set of circumstances which will tend to eliminate strong partyism and tend to throw a man upon his own independence. There have been examples over and over again of men of both parties who have very largely lost their partyism in the Senate, and have acted in a way which would seem to commend itself to my hon. friend. If you are going to seek a method by which you will have the least partyism, it will be the appointive method, something such as we have now. I think, however, that by the appointive method, with our political training and methods, we get probably not so strong a set of men as we would get by the elective system. I bear testimony to what my hon. friend has said as to the general character of the Senate, and of the men who have formed our Senate from earliest times to the present. I think they have averaged well with the members of the House of Commons, and that on the whole we have had a Senate of which we need not in any way be ashamed. But I think it is also a fact that the elective method tends to make a stronger Senate, as you then have a Senate which lives closer to the people and studies more closely the trends of business and political thought. I think that has been proven by the system in the United States. I think it goes without saying that the most influential and most important part of the Congress is their Senate; and that body is the stronger and more important, because its members come from the people. They owe their election to the

mass of voters they gather to their side, and they gather them to their side because of their own public spirited qualities and character. In the United States the elective senators have on the whole the most representative men.

But are you going to get rid of partyism by having an elective Senate? Australians and Canadians are not so different from each other and my hon. friend for Kingston very properly pointed to the lesson which is taught us by the slightest survey of the working out of the constitution in Australia. I am not saying it to the discredit of the Australians, but I am saying it because I think it is true, that there is not a more strongly partisan body as a Senate anywhere in the world than you find in the Commonwealth of Australia. Yet they are all elected. They were elected on the basis and with the thought—and that part of their constitution was framed on the basis and with the thought—that they would be non-partisan to the largest possible extent, and coming from all the different states would hold the balance equally and justly as between parties. But instead of that they are partisan to a degree; their elections are run on the partisan basis. They have the strength, in the opinion of my hon. friend, that their term is not co-terminus with the term of the members of the Lower House as we would call it. Theirs is a longer term, but they go back to the people periodically. So that, tested by these examples, it does not seem to me that my hon. friend (Mr. German) is by this method going to get the non-partisan body he desires in the Senate. I am not certain that a non-partisan body in the Senate, an entirely neutral body as regards party politics, would be a very workable branch of the governmental machine. In our governmental machine we work through the Government, which commands a majority so long as it does what is about right and holds to the principles of its party; and by the force and power of its organization it is able to get its measures through. But if you have in the Senate an absolutely neutral body politically you are transferring measures from a body which is strongly organized, where the Government and the party that supports it has the power to put through its measures and leaping into the midst of a body which has no organization of that kind, and over which the Government has no power other than the innate value of the legislation which it is seeking to carry through. You may say that that is an excellent test, that if a Gov-