

the necessity and indeed, if you like, the opportunities of interdependence in the realm of foreign policy than Canada, situated as we are on the North American Continent but being an active member, as we are also, of the Commonwealth of Nations, NATO and the United Nations and trying to play a responsible part in all those associations. We are of course, a free and a sovereign state, but freedom and sovereignty do not mean for us, or for other nations, either isolation or immunity; unless we abandon all of our national and international responsibilities, and perhaps not even then. It seems to me evident, then, that Canadian foreign policy must be influenced by various factors which we can and indeed which we often try to modify, but which we ignore at our peril.

These principal factors, I suggest, are four in number. The first is our membership in the Commonwealth of Nations, four-fifths of the people of which are now Asian, 443 million out of 530 million. Action by any of the Commonwealth nations which seems likely to foster and strengthen the ties which bind us together is almost certain to deserve, and certainly should receive, our support. The reverse, of course, is also often true.

In actual practice, there have been over the last 10 years or so since World War II very few international occasions when we have not been on the side of Great Britain; the centre of our Commonwealth. But the rarity of dissenting occasions stems not from our automatic acceptance of the policies of Great Britain but from the fact in the vast majority of international questions our interest and hers have happily been almost invariably identical. When that does not happen we, of course, regret it deeply and we do our best to reconcile our differences without delay and without recrimination. We experienced such regret indeed to the point of distress when we differed, not perhaps in objectives but in methods and procedures, with the United Kingdom on certain occasions at the United Nations Assembly meeting last autumn in connection with the Suez crisis. The Commonwealth was indeed deeply split on that issue and our relief was therefore correspondingly great, a relief shared in full measure by the Asian members of the Commonwealth, where the separation pressures were most intense, when this danger to the Commonwealth was removed by the Anglo-French decision to accept the cease-fire resolution of the United Nations Assembly. So the Commonwealth association remains strong and close. The friendly, informal and frank exchange of views in a sincere effort to reach agreement on all matters of common concern goes on, and the Commonwealth continues to play its invaluable and constructive role in today's troubled world; a role for which the whole world has reason to be grateful.

Mr. Churchill: What nations of the Commonwealth would have left the Commonwealth had the British and French not abided by the resolution of the United Nations?