

Eventually, those differences were overcome. Some changes were made by the Indian delegation which made the text perfectly acceptable to practically all delegations at the assembly. That process of acceptance and that process of coming together was made less difficult, I think, by the Soviet attitude toward the resolution, which was one of complete, unalterable and violent opposition to a constructive initiative by the nation putting it forward; indeed it was referred to by the leader of the Soviet delegation himself as a "rotten compromise". Their opposition was based on the fact that we should first have an automatic cease-fire declared and then armistice negotiations later. The objection to that, of course, was that, if the cease-fire took place and it was without an armistice, the prisoners would still be prisoners, the issues which centred around the prisoners-of-war would not be solved, and there was no assurance that they would be solved.

Meanwhile, from the point of view of military security, the cease-fire would have meant that one side was under a military disadvantage in comparison with the other side which had its base close at hand.

However, as I said, the Indian text was clarified; it was put to the vote a few days ago, with a result which is not usual these days in the United Nations Assembly. Fifty-four nations of the Assembly voted for it, including every Asian, Latin-American and African state, and only five members of the Assembly voted against it: the Soviet delegation and its four Communist satellites. One delegation, China, abstained. Therefore that Indian resolution has now become a resolution of the United Nations; and in my capacity as President of the Assembly, under the terms of the resolution, I have submitted it to the Foreign Minister of the Communist Government at Peking, and the Foreign Minister of the North Korean regime, together with a covering letter in which I attempted to meet some of the objections which they had previously put forward over the radio, and in other ways, and to clarify some of the points which they claimed were still doubtful. At the same time I thought it was probably not inappropriate, as President of the Assembly, to make an appeal to them to accept these proposals as the basis of an armistice and eventual peace, if they really wish to bring the war there to an end.

I do not know, of course, what the result of this transmission and appeal will be. It may mean an armistice, or it may not. I would not like to give odds on one side of the question; but whether the Communists accept this United Nations resolution or not, it surely has very great value to the United Nations and to us all even if it is turned down, because that resolution now becomes the United Nations' basis from which negotiations must now begin, if they are to be resumed. And in the future that may turn out to be a very important and very useful development because of course, this resolution, having been accepted by the United States Government, now becomes operative in respect of the Unified Command in Korea. And I suggest, ... that whatever may happen to this resolution in Peking and Pyongyang, it has been a very worth-while initiative to have taken, and a very valuable result has been achieved, since this initiative was taken by a great Asian country and supported enthusiastically by every other Asian, Arab and African state.