

the communique that makes direct reference to such measures. They should also make time at their subsequent Summits to seriously review the results of studies they have commissioned or the reports of bodies they have asked to "report back".

7) Summit leaders should seek to hold important issue-specific G7 ministerials fairly soon after the conclusion of the annual Summits, given that such ministerials are most helpful in ensuring compliance. For example, the timing of the IMF meetings of finance ministers and central bankers, three months following the Summit, is useful in this regard. On the other hand, pre-Summit ministerials, like those of the environment ministers, can help to shape the Summit agenda but may not help ensure compliance.

8) The G7 host country has significant influence over the Summit's agenda and - within limits - on the scope of the commitments achieved. Given the increased attention to Summit compliance following Halifax, this means the host government can, and should, influence whether compliance is scrupulous or slack across the agenda by ensuring that detailed follow-up reports are provided in the post-Summit period and that monitoring of Summit commitments is being effectively executed.

9) Increased institutionalization of the Summit process over the years has contributed to higher compliance levels over time. Leaders should thus work to expand, in functional areas where compliance remains weak, ministerials, working groups and sherpa meetings in order to increase transparency and communication flows among Summit countries. Such ministerials should be given explicit surveillance and implementation responsibilities. Development and north-south issues join macroeconomic policy and trade as the core agenda that each Summit has addressed, yet they remain alone in not having a stand-alone ministerial forum to oversee implementation. While foreign, finance and environment ministers meet regularly, given