

I. Cross-Cultural Dimensions of Multilateral Non-Proliferation and Arms Control Dialogues: An Overview

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Introduction

"Cultural" aspects of national and international security policies and practices have recently become the focus of attention in several different strands of analysis.¹ Of course, cultural explanations, from the most trivial to the most essential, have long been woven into the fabric of international security politics. As far back as François de Callières' eighteenth century diplomatic "handbook," the impact of the national differences that negotiators brought to the table was remarked upon.² But the "multilateralization" and regionalization of security (in the Middle East and Asia-Pacific regions, throughout the Americas, and even in post-Cold War Europe), the rapidity of global change, and the interdependence of states and regions, has meant that the cross-cultural aspects of contemporary security dialogues have assumed a much more prominent place in policy debates.

Examples abound, from the specific to the general. At the most concrete level, differences between, for example, *awase* ("adaptive") and *erabi* ("manipulative, can-do, or choosing") cultures can be used as a means of explaining different approaches to bilateral or multilateral negotiations on a variety of international issues.³ One step up the ladder of generality, cultural factors can be used to explain persistent miscommunications and misperceptions on issues of war and peace between, for example, the Israelis and Egyptians.⁴ At a somewhat more general level, cultural factors can be used to explain the origins of (and different reactions to) the chemical and nuclear weapons taboos of non-use, or to the

¹ Among other major works, see Peter Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), Raymond Cohen, *Negotiating Across Cultures: Communication Obstacles in International Diplomacy* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1990); Robert A. Rubinstein, "Cultural Aspects of Peacekeeping: Notes on the Substance of Symbols," *Millennium*, 22:3 (Winter 1993), 547-562. Other relevant contributions will be cited below. One should also note that the United States Institute for Peace has just launched a series of projects on "cross-cultural negotiation: country studies," and that the Ford Foundation supported a regional project organized by Ken Booth and Russell Troad.

² "The last quality is an advantage that the Spanish nation has over ours; which is naturally lively, restless, and which has no sooner begun an affair, but would willingly see the end of it...commonly a Spanish minister is not much in haste." François de Callières, *The Art of Diplomacy* [1716] (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1983), 87.

³ Cohen, *Negotiation across Cultures*, 30-31, who in turn takes the distinction from Kinhide Mushakoji, "The Cultural Premises of Japanese Diplomacy," in Japan Center for International Exchange, ed., *The Silent Power* (Tokyo: The Simul Press, 1976).

⁴ Raymond Cohen, *Culture and Conflict in Egyptian-Israeli Relations: A Dialogue of the Deaf* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990). Some examples will be offered below.