

acquire direct control of three bridges, and the most profitable bridges would remain outside its grasp for many years. In these circumstances, a cost-benefit analysis is needed, to determine whether the costs of an authority directly controlling three or four bridges and regulating others would be justified in relation to benefits, but the deciding factors for or against an overall authority would probably be political. Of course, the Government could favour an overall authority in principle but postpone its creation until a specified number of bridges guaranteeing a profitable operation had come under government ownership, but the effect of this might be to thrust the arrangement so far into the future that it would have no practical meaning. The advantages of an overall authority would inevitably be considerably enhanced by any action which would increase the number of bridges available for assignment to the Authority, and the possibility of action to achieve this will be considered later.

Assuming for the moment that sufficient bridges could be operated by the Authority to justify its existence, it is evident that there are merits in both the overall authority and separate bridge authorities, but in general, the weight of evidence appears to favour some form of overall authority since such a body would meet provincial demands, ensure centralized expertise and facilitate financing and planning. However, many problems are encountered at the individual bridge level and need to be handled in cooperation with the appropriate U.S. bridge authority, and an overall authority would be too far removed from the action to make prompt decisions. It would therefore seem desirable that the overall authority should only concern itself with general principles and with those functions which can reasonably be centralized. The day-to-day operation of each bridge should be delegated to an individual bridge management whenever possible so that problems can be handled on the basis of local knowledge and