activities and facilities; however, it sets a precedent for mandatory access which could strengthen other agreements curbing proliferation.

Inherent in the debate over this treaty's verification regime was the classic dilemma which could be applied to a number of bilateral and multilateral agreements: how can a party have as much access to the other side's facilities as can be negotiated, while not compromising its own sensitive facilities? The compromise for the CWC verification regime attempts to ensure the protection of national security information and activities against intelligence-gathering challenge inspections; at the same time it strives for a challenge regime which has a reasonable chance of detecting noncompliance by other parties to the agreement.

While the CWC verification regime will not satisfy those who insist upon the criterion of political significance, the regime meets the standard of **military** significance if **only** military use of chemical weapons is considered. It meets this standard because of the synergies inherent in the combination of on-site inspections and the advanced means of gathering intelligence from multiple sources available to the U.S., Canada, Russia, and other developed countries which will be signatories to the Convention.

The CWC verification regime could be greatly simplified and still meet the criterion of military significance when only military uses are considered. No verification regime will be able to meet the political criterion and thus deny a Third World country the ability to acquire chemical weapons for terrorist or deterrent purposes. Nevertheless, the Convention will provide the infrastructure for improving international security by setting a standard of compliance for its signatories in the area of chemical weapons nonproliferation.

The CWC verification regime will be strengthened by initiatives taken in the 22-nation Australia Group. That supplier group has expanded its export controls to cover 50 chemical weapons precursors as well as CW-related dual-use equipment, and adopted a multilateral control list of biological organisms, toxins, and equipment.

*The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)*

The BTWC has no verification regime; rather, it depends upon national intelligence means, declarations, and reporting without any provisions for intrusive challenge inspections of either declared or undeclared facilities. The recent statement made by President Yeltsin that the 1979 pulmonary anthrax "epidemic" near Sverdlovsk (now Ekaterinburg) was in fact the result of an accident at a biological weapons research facility raises serious questions about this approach. However, it should be remembered that analysis of data from NTM and other sources had earlier led to the conclusion that this was in fact a biological weapons program; this conclusion was reported in the annual reports entitled, "Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control," issued by the United States.

Recently, the United States has argued that new verification measures "could even hinder effective verification by providing a false sense of confidence," since an inspection might not be able to uncover illegal biological research. For that reason, the U.S. BTWC negotiating team has not tabled any verification proposals, although it states that it will evaluate proposals and suggestions made by the other signatories from a technical and scientific standpoint.

It can be argued that there are lessons to be learned from the UNSCOM biological weapons inspections in Iraq which might apply to a BTWC verification regime. One lesson might be that despite the fact that OSIs cannot detect noncompliance with absolute certainty, the existence of an inspection program, complemented with aerial surveillance, may deter a clandestine biological weapons program or at least add to its costs. If such challenge inspections had been conducted at the biological weapons installation near Sverdlovsk, would they have detected the