

In addition to the two Canadian reactor sales, a series of commercial transactions around the globe have provided the stimulus for a heightened public sensitivity to nuclear exports both in Canada and elsewhere. Among the most notable transactions were the following:

- The announced sale of a reprocessing plant to the Republic of Korea by a French company.
- The cancellation of this sale by the Korean Government before its purchase of the CANDU reactor from Canada.
- The agreement by West Germany to sell a full nuclear fuel cycle to Brazil following U.S. refusal to do so.
- The sale of a \$100 million reprocessing plant to Pakistan by a French company.
- The sale of a nuclear reactor to South Africa by France following delays in a deal with a Dutch-American consortium.

Adding to the growing public uneasiness over the threat to non-proliferation posed by the spread of nuclear technology were reports that Israel was in possession of several nuclear devices.

Production of Weapons-Usable Material - How to Stop It

The year's events have focussed the attention of governments on a major shortfall in the international safeguards system. Countries accepting safeguards are still permitted freely to stockpile weapons-usable material (either uranium highly enriched in U-235, made by enriching natural uranium in an enrichment plant or plutonium-239 separated from spent fuel by the reprocessing of spent fuel in a reprocessing plant). The ready availability of such weapons-usable material within a country's borders shortens the production time for a nuclear weapon from months to weeks, perhaps even days. This time span is too brief for the effective exercise of international sanctions and weakens the credibility of international safeguards. The search for an internationally acceptable solution for this problem was given added urgency by the French and West German sales.

There are a variety of bilateral controls at present which do serve to prohibit such activity unless there is economic justification for it. Canada generally requires that its consent be obtained before any nuclear material of Canadian origin or produced in a Canadian supplied facility can be reprocessed or enriched to more