

PREFACE

NOTHING is drier than a ship's log; not even *Statutes at Large* or the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle. The one redeeming feature is the log of some great sea fight. But there were no battles in Canadian waters. Why, then, is it worth while, and very well worth while, to edit a selection from the logs of H.M.S.S. engaged in the three campaigns of Louisburg, Quebec, and Montreal, which determined the British conquest of Canada?

The answer is, because these logs are the simplest and least self-conscious of all records; because they are the record of the Navy's work there; because the fleets were relatively stronger forces than the armies; because, in addition to their own work, they gave their armies enormous advantages over the enemy in every detail of ordnance, commissariat, transport, mobility, scouting and military intelligence; because, as all the seas in the world are interdependent, every squadron of the British Navy was an integral part of the single overwhelming force which was then the prime deciding factor in the greatest of all imperial wars waged for oversea dominion; and, finally, because the public, and the Canadian public in particular, have not yet found out the one true point of view. They all admit that the conquest was effected by the joint forces of the United Service, and not by either the Army or Navy alone. But the stock saying, that Wolfe was "supported by a fleet," completely inverts the nature and functions of the two constituent parts of this United Service. What really happened was that Saunders, whose great fleet was working out one phase of a world-wide amphibious war,