

evidence that Soviet submarines were positioned around the coast of Canada, perhaps even in the Hudson Bay. This, in the opinion of the Canadian delegate was a much greater threat to Canada than bombers.

In the field of anti-submarine warfare, a member of the U.S. delegation emphasized, U.S.-Canadian cooperation was also essential. There needed to be a true joint effort in the anti-submarine warfare field particularly in light of the increasing Soviet submarine threat.

The members of the U.S. delegation then reviewed the air and space threat to the North American continent as they saw it. They were convinced, and informed by the U.S. military establishment, that the Soviet bomber threat would continue to exist at least into the mid-70's. In addition to this, the Soviet Union would always have an effective ICBM threat. While members of the U.S. delegation had serious reservations about an ABM system, particularly because of its high cost they recognized that the U.S. had to maintain its research and development in this field as well as in offensive weaponry and considered that the deployment of the so-called thin ABM system was primarily designed to continue effective U.S. development of this weapon. Otherwise, the Soviet Union would have an opportunity to be far ahead of the U.S. in this field. In this connection, the members of the U.S. delegation emphasized that the Soviet Union had refused on repeated occasions to discuss the U.S. proposed mutual limitation on the further development of ABM/ICBM systems.

In his opening statement a Canadian delegate mentioned that sooner or later the West will have to normalize its relations with mainland China. Who will initiate this move and when was the main question. It was suggested that Canada, because it already has a toe in China because of its commercial relations, could be helpful to the Western world in taking the initiative. The Canadian delegation was unanimous in recommending that formal recognition of mainland China should be arrived at as soon as practicable. Although some members of the Canadian delegation mentioned that Communist China should also be admitted to the United Nations, the majority thought that admission to the United Nations of Peking at this time would be highly disruptive.

A member of the U.S. delegation indicated that hearings on the subject of the future U.S.

role in Asia are now in progress and offered to make the record of these hearings available to the Canadian delegation. While the U.S. does not recognize Communist China and has no present intentions to do so, there have been a continuing series of diplomatic contacts between the two countries first at Geneva and most recently in Warsaw. The U.S. has used this channel to indicate to the Communist Chinese that it does not contemplate any military action against them and does not intend to intervene in their internal affairs. The U.S. has attempted to further these contacts by establishing relations in the cultural and journalistic fields but these have so far not met with any positive Communist Chinese response.

The members of the U.S. delegation held that the issue of seating Communist China was presently inappropriate, and untimely, particularly since the efforts to seat Communist China at the United Nations were losing support from other quarters including from some of the African nations. It was also necessary to explore what the effects of recognition would be on China's more immediate neighbors such as India and Burma.

It was emphasized several times that there was no visible indication on the part of China of a desire to establish relations with the U.S. and indeed Communist China had made numerous demands before it would be willing to enter the United Nations. Finally, it was emphasized that in the minds of the American people, any future steps toward recognition of Communist China were intimately coupled with the events in Vietnam and there was not likely to be any change until the problems of Vietnam were settled.

There was also some discussion of a possible Canadian recognition of Communist China and of the effects that such a step would have in the United States.

During the discussion on Communist China, one of the members of the Canadian delegation suggested that the Committee seek the knowledge and experience of one of the members of the Canadian delegation who was not present at the time at the meeting. Later in opening a discussion on the Vietnam question the Co-chairman from the American delegation mentioned that the crux of the matter regarding Vietnam was that there existed a number of alternatives or courses of action that could be taken by the United