

legitimacy. Of course, Russia needs to be flexible in settling its bilateral issues, but we have no sympathy with the notion that there can now be additional nuclear weapons.

To Canada, the proliferation of nuclear weapons is the world's number one security problem, dramatically underlined by the lessons of our discoveries about Iraq. This is not a casual matter for us, and we will not acquiesce in the emergence of new nuclear weapons states among our new CSCE and NACC partners.

We will also take steps to reduce the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities to other states. For example, the establishment of international science and technology centres in Moscow and Kiev will reduce the nuclear "brain drain," and we will also be helping countries develop export control regimes to reduce the risks of inadvertent proliferation.

Our abiding concern for the safety of civilian nuclear reactors is enhanced by the shadow of Chernobyl. Atomic Energy Canada Limited (AECL) and Ontario Hydro are currently working urgently to find out how Canadian expertise can assist in the safety of reactors in Lithuania and Russia and in the management of nuclear waste.

Multilaterally, the G-7 is working on a number of joint approaches, while we work through the UN International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to limit the risks and increase the benefits of safe nuclear energy.

These nuclear proliferation and safety issues are top priorities for Canada. We bring to them almost half a century of technical expertise and policy conviction. They will be at the forefront in our international efforts at NATO and NACC in Oslo in June, at the Munich G-7 Summit in July and at the Helsinki CSCE Summit right after that.

Helping these countries make the transition from military-dominated to consumer-driven economies will be costly. Powerful enterprises have to be scrapped, trading patterns changed and workers retrained, and an increasingly politicized military might be tempted to intervene at the slightest stumble.

Canada is participating in all of these efforts to give Western publics the real peace dividend they expect. There can be no backsliding in our conviction or our commitment; we all recognize that the consequences of failure are very real.

The multilateral management of a stable transition for the new Europe will require a level of vision comparable to that which created the institutions that guaranteed the democratic choice to postwar Europe, brought the West unprecedented prosperity and