advice, co-operation and assistance of the free Asian countries. I think it is most important--and I am sure the House agrees with me--that those countries should feel that, even if they are not members of it, any collective security arrangements in Southeast Asia that may be worked out should be in their interest, and have taken into consideration their interests. If not enough Asian states feel that way, the foundation of any Southeast Asian security organization will not be very firm.

In this connection, the Commonwealth association can play and has played a valuable role. And that is one reason why, in my opinion, it was helpful and wise to keep the Asian members of Commonwealth informed, as they were kept informed, closely and continuously, of Geneva developments. It is also one reason why I regret that India, or some similar Asian state or states, was not a member of the Geneva conference.

The working out of an arrangement which would be based on the considerations I have ventured to mention will not be easy, and I think that it will take time. But there is dilemma here, in that time may be against those who desire to build up a security system to deter aggression in Southeast Asia. After all, there is a war going on there. It is not easy, in diplomacy, to reconcile considerations of defence urgency with the necessity for careful political preparation and of securing general and wholehearted agreement. There can be danger both from over-timidity and from over-zealousness. There can also be trouble between friends if there is doubt about timing, about exactly what is being planned, about what we are trying to secure, and about what we are trying to prevent.

We should certainly be clear on that last point-what we are trying to prevent. Is the united action which it is desired to bring about to be against communism as such, regardless of the means, military or otherwise, which it adopts to secure its ends in any particular Asian country; or is the commitment for collective action against military aggression only? If it is to be the first, then we should realize that arrangements to achieve this end will be interpreted as a declaration of implacable and fixed hostility, with all action short of general war, and even at the risk of such war, against Asian communism.

The other concept is that which is embodied in NATO. Here the commitment for action, in contradistiction to consultation, is clear and explicit. And it comes into operation as soon as a military aggression has been committed by one state against another--but not sooner.

I do not think it will do any service to the unity of those who are working together for peace if there is not a very clear understanding on this point, and if any negotiations are not based on that understanding.

Now, if I may close by referring a little more specifically to the policy of the Canadian Government in respect to the questions we have been discussing at Geneva, and which are still under discussion there.

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