

Disarmament

Peacekeeping, and for that matter all machinery for the peaceful settlement of disputes, is essentially responsive to specific situations. Men have long dreamed of a more positive concept, the development of a world-wide peace and security system in which individual nations would abandon possession of the means of waging war. This is all the more necessary in view of military developments over the past two decades, and especially the acquisition of/military nuclear power by a few countries. devastating

It is from this point of view that Canada has approached disarmament negotiations. We share, of course, the common objective of an agreed system of general and complete disarmament which would give security to all nations and thereby ensure our own. In present circumstances, however, we must pursue partial objectives both for their intrinsic value and as a foundation for future progress. This has been the focus of the negotiations in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee since the last session of the Assembly. While we are disappointed that the ENDC has had only limited success, we nevertheless consider that it remains the best available forum for the negotiation of arms control agreements.

There is no cause more urgent than to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. No single measure will provide a solution. A series of measures directed to various facets of the issue will be needed.

First, there is wide agreement that a non-proliferation treaty is imperative. On the central issue of the definition of proliferation we believe that the formula must prevent nuclear weapons from passing into the control of additional states or groups of states. This should not be inconsistent with legitimate measures of collective defence. The exhaustive discussion of non-proliferation by the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva has made it quite clear what the obstacles to a final agreement are. It is to be hoped that the Great Powers will find it possible to remove these obstacles and to leave the way clear for the agreement which the world so greatly needs.

Second, as an essential corollary to a non-proliferation treaty we think that the nuclear powers and the United Nations should urgently consider ways of extending meaningful guarantees to non-nuclear weapon states who have foregone the right to acquire nuclear weapons. We think that such states should have assurances for their security against nuclear attack or threat of it.

Third, it is in our view essential that if such a treaty is to be effective and if it is to inspire confidence, some means of verification should be included. At Geneva we have taken a stand for a