

political dimensions, as to how much planning and preparation is possible and necessary before substantial reductions in military expenditure can take place. Some of the advocates of conversion planning, basing themselves on the past success of "military industrial complexes" in maintaining their growth, may have got themselves into a dangerous situation of self-fulfilling prophecy when they now say that conversion planning is a prerequisite to further cuts.

Post-war demobilization experience demonstrates that even massive shifts of labour and production back to the civilian sector can be absorbed, with huge benefit, especially in economies where flexibility and mobility are high. Policies to enhance such mobility, through re-training, and small business and community development assistance, can be very helpful. Conversion planning by firms, communities and individuals is all to the good, but it would do fatal damage to the cause of arms reductions if we were to accept the proposition that none of them could go ahead until a credibly planned alternative future were in place for every enterprise and individual likely to be affected.

In addition to the challenge of conversion, there are two other possible dangers associated with arms control progress which require preparation and response.

A Framework for Managing East-West Change

The first concern is that of dangerous instability in an environment of major arms reductions, unpredictable political convulsions sweeping Eastern Europe, and varied responses among Western countries, including those on the delicate issue of German reunification. Many different forums and relationships in addition to the arms control talks themselves (with their respective NATO and WTO caucuses) come into play as the world attempts to manage different aspects of this multifaceted European change: the European Community plays a role, as do the Council of Europe, the UN Economic Commission for Europe, the Western European Union and many other organizations with overlapping memberships and agenda.

Obviously US-USSR summits and bilateral negotiations also play a part, although the West Europeans were very forceful (in the lead-up to the December summit) in saying that "Malta is not Yalta;" in other words, that in 1989 they were not prepared to accept dictation to all of Europe from these two great powers.