

as it may seem, few of us discover how little, and yet how much we know of a subject, until we collate and reduce our ideas into writing. The exercise, too, directs the mind into a systematic and logical train of thought, which is of the utmost importance to officers in issuing either verbal or written orders. For, as Lord Lytton quaintly puts it into the mouth of "mine host": "If a man cannot write what he means for to say, I does not see how he can say what he means for to speak." So important, in my opinion, is this exercise as a means of professionally educating our officers, that after the manœuvres, I should insist on all field officers submitting detailed reports, in which they should bring to special notice all matters of interest, and point out any errors or shortcomings that may have come under their immediate observation. A staff officer of ability should then be nominated to examine these reports, and, under the orders of the officer commanding the camp should draw up a memorandum, which should be printed and distributed among the officers in camp. The soldiers take a much keener and more intelligent interest in these matters than is generally supposed. A well-digested report of this description would, therefore, be of great value to both officers and men, and would be much appreciated by all ranks. For want of some system of this kind, our camps of exercise are not as useful as they might be.

Apropos of the study of military history and professional subjects, it is doubtful if our studies are always directed into the right channel. We study with avidity the tactics of other nations, but ignore our own glorious military history and its teachings. In the mouths of babes and sucklings it is Von this and Von that. Before the Franco-German War it was Jomini, or some other French military writer; while Napier's "Peninsular War" lies neglected and forgotten on our shelves, a work which teaches the principles of discipline, and practical tactics and strategy, as no other book has taught them. What, after all, have we learnt from our neighbours, as far as infantry tactics are concerned? The attack in column is a thing of the past; groups are now condemned; and our friends across the Channel are adopting the "thin red line,"—practically the formation we have employed from time immemorial. If we ever take an active part in an European war, our tactics will undoubtedly be the tactics of the Peninsular War, the defensive-offensive. These tactics suit best our national character and the size of our army. Our troops would lie close, firing volley after volley into the ranks of the advancing enemy, and when within striking distance, one more volley, then "up guards and at them," and our foes would quickly vanish before "the smile of the British bayonet!" In Asiatic warfare the tactics would, of course, be very different. There it is seldom wise to await the attack; as a rule, the offensive should be assumed as soon as the artillery has prepared the way.

It is, however, not sufficient for an officer to attend camps of exercise, or to study military history; he should be constantly on the watch for opportunities of applying the principles which he has learnt from camps or books. Many of our reverses in the field have been due to the neglect of the first principles of war, principles which savages even, recognize and practise. It is to be feared that the recent disaster in Manipur may have to be attributed to some such cause. A carefully written history reviewing and criticising all our misfortunes and failures during the present century, would teach lessons of caution and prudence, which Englishmen, owing to their overweening confidence in their own courage and resource when confronted with danger (a fault with a good side to it), seem to have a special faculty for forgetting. I have always maintained, and acted on the opinion, that, even during peace, all movements of troops should be conducted as if in the presence of an enemy; in this way men and officers would not only learn how such movements must be carried out in time of war, but would

so thoroughly acquire the habit of attending to all the necessary precautions, that there need be no fear of their being neglected at a juncture when neglect would mean disaster. For example, a regiment moving in relief should be covered by an advance guard, a rear guard, and by flankers; on reaching its halting-place for the night, pickets should be thrown out and a proper system of patrolling enforced. Scrupulous attention to these duties will teach all ranks lessons which cannot be learnt on the ordinary parade-ground or in a barrack square, but only on the march through country whose physical features are always varying.

Before closing this introductory chapter, let me say a few words regarding the Staff College. Military men, even men of ability and experience, are apt to underrate the benefits accruing from a course of study at the Staff College. But who can doubt its value to officers when they have the opportunity of practically applying the knowledge so acquired? If I were selecting a staff officer, and the choice lay between two men, both strangers to one, but one of whom had qualified and the other had not, I should unhesitatingly choose the former. Whether the course is sufficiently practical, I am not prepared to discuss at present; but the College authorities must look to it that the officers that draft into the Army are not like the student who, when asked to move a brigade as a test of his acquirements, coolly answered that he had not been taught to direct less than one hundred thousand men! Sir Charles Napier mentions this as having actually occurred at Shorncliffe.

QUERIES AND REPLIES.

THE PRESENT ARMS.

Can you inform me whether the alterations made by the following "Army Orders" in drill books affect the Active Militia:—

No. 122, April, 1890.

No. 163, May, 1890.

No. 318, September 1890, (Vol. 1, Field Artillery Drill.)

I think if the above orders were acted upon it would save instructors a good deal of time and trouble teaching recruits, etc., with naturally stiff joints, the second motion of the "Present Arms," as laid down prior to above Army Orders being published.

J. MAHER, Master Gunner,
"A" Battery, C. A.

Kingston, 6th April, 1891.

A. Not having been proclaimed in our General Orders the Army Orders above quoted are not in force here. The change in the second motion of the "present" was made necessary in England by the introduction of the magazine rifle with which the former procedure was impracticable.—
EDITOR.

THE 10TH REGIMENT VETERANS.

Q EDITOR MILITIA GAZETTE,—In a War Office return of Regular troops in the various provinces of British North America in 1812, the 10th Regiment Veterans appears as being in Upper Canada, and stands at the head of the regiments of Infantry, taking precedence of the 1st and 8th Foot. Will you be so good as to let me know, through the columns of your valuable paper, the reason why the corps was called the 10th Veterans, and why it took precedence of the two regiments mentioned? and oblige.

Yours truly,

April 23rd, 1891.

A CANADIAN.

[If any of our readers can furnish the information, will they be kind enough to do so.—EDITOR.]

Probably no modern medicine has obtained wider notoriety, within a given time, than the really wonderful SLOCUM'S OXYGENIZED EMULSION OF PURE COD LIVER OIL. To sufferers from lung troubles we say: take no other. As all druggists sell it, it is easily obtained.