

stract. Here again comes in the advantage of the object-teaching and manual-training methods. The pupil's attention is spontaneously held by any problem that involves a new material object or an activity on any one's part. The teacher's earliest appeals, therefore, must be through objects shown, or acts performed or described. Theoretic curiosity, curiosity about the rational relations between things, can hardly be said to awake until adolescence is reached. The sporadic metaphysical inquiries of children as to who made God, and why they have five fingers, need hardly be counted here. But when the theoretic instinct is once alive in the pupil, an entirely new order of pedagogic relations begins for him, a fact with which all teachers are familiar. And both in its sensible and in its rational developments, disinterested curiosity may be successfully appealed to in the child with much more certainty than in the adult, in whom this intellectual instinct has grown so torpid as usually to require quickening by entering into a sociation with some selfish personal interest. Of this latter point I will say more anon.

*Imitation.* Man has always been recognized as the imitative animal *par excellence*; and there is hardly a book on psychology, however old, which has not devoted at least one paragraph to this fact. It is strange, however, that the full scope and pregnancy of the imitative impulse in man has had to wait till the last dozen years to become adequately recognized. M. Tarde led the way in his admirably original work, "*Les Lois de l'Imitation*"; and in our own country Professors Royce and Baldwin have kept the ball rolling with all the energy that could be desired. Each of us is in fact what he is almost exclusively by virtue of his imitativeness. We become conscious of what we ourselves are by imitating others. The consciousness of what the others are precedes; the

sense of self grows by the sense of pattern. The entire accumulated wealth of mankind—languages, arts, institutions and sciences—is passed on from one generation to another by what Baldwin has called social heredity, each generation simply imitating the last. Into the particulars of this most fascinating chapter of psychology I have no time to go. The moment one hears Tarde's proposition uttered, however, one feels how supremely true it is. Invention—using the term most broadly—and imitation are the two legs, so to call them, on which the human race historically has walked.

Imitation shades imperceptibly into *emulation*. Emulation is the impulse to imitate what you see another doing, in order not to appear inferior; and it is hard to draw a sharp line between the manifestations of the two impulses, so inextricably do they mix their effects. Emulation is the very nerve of human society. Why are you, my hearers, sitting here before me? If no one whom you ever heard of had attended a "summer school" or teachers' institute, would it have occurred to any one of you to break out independently and do a thing so unprescribed by fashion? Probably not. Nor would your pupils come to you unless the children of their parents' neighbors were all simultaneously being sent to school. We wish not to be lonely or eccentric, and we wish not to be cut off from our share in things which to our neighbors seem desirable possessions.

In the school-room, imitation and emulation play absolutely vital parts. Every teacher knows the advantage of having certain things performed by whole bands of children at a time. The teacher who meets with most success is the teacher whose own ways are the most imitable. A teacher should never try to make the pupils do a thing which she cannot do herself. "Come and let me show you how" is an incomparably better stimu-