- 1. The members cannot leave their duties at Ottawa, and must therefore delegate to subordinates much very important work.
- 2. They hold their offices by "political tenure," and are liable to sudden changes, whereby the value of their experience is lost.
- 3. They can scarcely be regarded by the public as so absolutely removed from personal or political bias as independent members of a permanent tribunal.
- 4. They cannot possibly give their exclusive attention to their railway duties, and in taking upon themselves the duties which would necessarily devolve upon them, they would, in fact, be performing judicial functions. "Those and other reasons," as the Commissioners say, occur against the selection of the Railway Committee of the Privy Council as the Railway tribunal; but they say, "it is believed they are outweighed by the consideration of general and ultimate advantage," thus proceeding with "extreme caution" in dealing with subjects affecting the entire community, while a material practical advantage is secured by the fact that any required changes in the law, or in its application, are secured, thus identifying the Government with its execution.

From the fair manner in which the evidence and information obtained by the Commission has now been laid before the country, it is quite open to those who choose to do so, to discuss this all-important question from every point of view, and thus get the benefit of the ideas of many whose opinions are valuable, and who otherwise might never come forward to give them.

Having for several years back heard of the proposal to appoint a permanent Commission for the adjustment of railway matters, we naturally looked forward to that being the channel through which this great problem would be solved. But, while gladly testifying to the good work done by the Railway Commission, and being satisfied that great benefit will be ultimately derived from the information obtained and the report of the Commission, we must confess a certain amount of disappointment. That which many thought would be best, and looked for, was the appointment of an independent Commission free from political bias or control, and able to give their whole and undivided attention to the great railway problems constantly arising for solution. We doubt whether anything short of this will put the railway question on a permanent and satisfactory footing. But such a tribunal must be composed of first-rate men, well paid, and made perfectly independent, with powers limited and defined in a specific manner.

The Government could scarcely do otherwise than follow the recommendation of the Commissioners in reference to this Railway Committee. But it certainly would be warranted, in view of the information now gathered together, and reported to the Governor-General, in at once considering the constitution of, and necessary details connected with the appointment of a permanent body, which would give its entire time and consideration to the subject, and which would be able, from time to time, to recommend such legislation as might be deemed necessary. We think this the more as from the position occupied by the personnel of the proposed Railway Committee of the Privy Council, and from the