

and too callous to be wounded by their charms. I am not going to be married either to the fascinating accomplished niece of the President, or to the widow of a late Foreign Minister, or to any other maiden or relict to whom I am given by the newspapers." A royal personage (not Queen Victoria) presented a sort of ultimatum to him that he should marry one of her ladies-in-waiting. With the trained alertness of his profession, he asked for and obtained a twenty-four hours' reprieve, and thus secured time to refuse. When he waited upon Lincoln with Queen Victoria's letter officially communicating the news of the marriage of the Prince of Wales, Lincoln instantly remarked: "Well, Lord Lyons, all I can say is 'Go and do thou likewise'". Lyons told Sir Edward Malet, who was one of his secretaries at the Paris embassy during the Franco-German war, that there were "very few men who could keep secrets and next to no women".¹ Small wonder that he died unmarried.

The choice of a successor to Lord Lyons, who received for his services the thanks of his sovereign and an earldom, fell upon Sir Frederick Bruce, a younger brother of Lord Elgin. Elgin's success in negotiating the Canadian treaty of reciprocity in 1854 has been attributed in large measure, and not unfairly, to his social gifts and his comprehension of the American character. Certainly no Governor-General of Canada enjoyed greater popularity in Washington than he, with the possible exception of Lord Dufferin. Bruce's appointment was made in 1865 and there is reason to think that he possessed some of his brother's tactfulness, and would have proved equal to the trying period through which Anglo-American relations were about to pass. But his health was delicate and he died at Boston in 1867. The place was given to Sir Edward Thornton, who remained at Washington for the unusually long term of thirteen years, facing the crisis which followed the civil war, the menace of the fisheries dis-

pute, and the perplexity of other questions in which the interests of Canada were inseparably and sometimes embarrassingly bound up.

A close study of the past explains the cause of Canadian criticism of British diplomacy. A general indictment cannot be laid. In nearly every negotiation Canadian interests were guarded wisely and well. There are exceptions, such as Lord Ashburton's complaisance in 1843, because, whatever may have been the value of the "red line map", his tactics were timid and he was no match for Daniel Webster. The failure to press for the "Fenian claims" in 1871 was long a grievance. This was due to an error in the terms of reference, and the British Commission, of which Sir John Macdonald was a member, was not guilty of the omission. In the correspondence of Macdonald from Washington, which is one of the most striking features in the Memoirs by Sir Joseph Pope, the letters (written usually at the close of the day's sessions) undoubtedly betray irritation toward his fellow-negotiators. Sir John Macdonald expressly excepts the British Minister, Sir Edward Thornton, from weakness during the proceedings, although he blames him for forgetting to include the Fenian claims.

Then, nearer to our own day, is the Alaskan boundary award. A furious outcry arose at the time. In all the boundary disputes, a fatal defect in our case has been the slowness of Canada to occupy, settle, and hold doubtful territory. But, acting for ourselves, could we have driven better bargains than Britain made for us? An impartial survey of a century's diplomacy proves conclusively that we could not have done so. This is the practical obstacle to an independent Canadian Minister at Washington. The prestige and authority of Great Britain, with her unconquered arms, are our buckler and our shield. The Canadian representative would wield no more power than the agent of a small South American republic.

¹ Shifting Scenes. By Sir Edward Malet.