

*External Affairs*

*Journal* of March 12, 1954, which, in part at least, I think would be fairly representative of what was and would be the feeling of the public generally in that regard. The editorial is entitled "About Recognizing China". It reads in part as follows:

A Tokyo dispatch now quotes Prime Minister St. Laurent as saying with respect to recognition of communist China that "it is only the common sense, realistic approach that allied countries eventually deal with communist China as the government in effective control of the China mainland."

This is better, more sensible, than what Mr. St. Laurent was reported to have said earlier at Seoul, namely:

"I do feel that some day we are going to have to be realistic. We are going to have to admit the present government of China as the government the people want."

I feel quite sure, in spite of my respect for the journalists who were there and who were doing their best to report what they heard and what they understood, that I did not put it that way because I never had it in my mind in that form. It was the contrary form I had in my mind, that in spite of our dislike of communist or totalitarian governments we could not expect to have the kind of government we wanted. It would be the kind of government—and I must have said this—that they wanted. I should not have said "they wanted". I should have said the kind of government they had actually in control of the forces we are opposing. The article goes on to say—and I think everyone would agree with this:

No country can ever know with certainty whether the government possessed by some other country is the government its people want. And the fact is that Canada now recognizes any number of countries without being at all sure that their government is what their people want. There is Russia, and Czechoslovakia, and Poland, and Spain; possibly others.

What Canada does, and must be compelled to do, and what all other countries must be compelled to do sooner or later, just because it is the only sensible practicable way, is to recognize the government of a country which is in effective control—which exists in fact.

I would not go quite that far because I would now be very chary about using the word "recognition". It has for so many different people so many different connotations. There is what is sometimes called the concept of legal recognition. Others refer to it as diplomatic recognition. I think perhaps it is better to use some other word that cannot have so many significations. When I was using it I was using it in its broadest sense, that we just had to avoid closing our eyes and had to see, to recognize, that the government that was in control, and with whom we had to deal if we expected to make any kind of arrangement that would be implemented,

was the government that was in fact in control of the forces that we were opposing. But the article goes on to say:

We must and should recognize the present government of China, not because we approve of it, not because we do not detest and condemn some of the crimes it has committed, but simply because of the inescapable fact that it is the only government there—the only government exercising authority. Such recognition need not come at this moment;

With that, I fully agree. I would even go so far as to say, instead of "need", we might well say "should" not come at this time. The editorial continues:

—perhaps should not come while Red China remains an aggressor, nor until we see what emerges from Geneva. We must respect—certainly not flout—the opinion of our allies. But for heaven's sake let us not take the impossible position that recognition of China cannot come while China has a communist government—

Then, the article goes on:

It is a pity—

I think it is a pity.

—that the question of Canada's "recognition" of China should have come up in the uncertain way of press conference statements. Mr. St. Laurent doubtless was asked the question in a dozen ways, and it is understandable that, in the east, he desired to indicate Canada's open-mindedness on this vexed subject. But upon his return to Canada parliament should be given a clearer explanation, though the shadow of the Geneva conference will compel restraint.

Of course the shadow of the Geneva conference not only compels restraint but I think is going to be something more than a shadow. It is going to be something that will, to a certain degree, project light into the future. At the present time I was not expressing government policy, but I was expressing frankly my own feelings about it. I was really happy at having heard that there was going to be a Geneva conference at which the government which in fact controls the forces whose conduct has had such a disturbing effect on world peace would be represented and would be talking over the possibility of removing the uncertain conditions of this cease-fire with two impregnable lines of soldiers opposite each other in Korea. Perhaps the conference would be able to do something about the situation which is of grave concern to the whole world, that is the fighting that is going on in Indo-China.

I had the distinct impression that most of the embarrassment felt by French leaders with respect to the European army was a consequence of the drain upon their human and material resources as a result of the fighting going on in Indo-China. I felt that these questions that were being thrown at me arose out of this invitation that had been extended by the four great powers to the representatives of the only government that