an appeal to the privy council in a criminal case. I was not interested in that phase of it, because so far as the province of Alberta was concerned, we merely listened to the argument, being concerned only with the determination of the merits of the appeal. The case was argued by counsel on behalf of the Dominion, by counsel on behalf of the provinces and as I have said by the Attorney General of England. In the end the court held that that section of this parliament was ultra vires for the simple reason that in the days of William there was passed a statute under which any subject of the realm had the right to appeal to the foot of the throne or to the privy council. The theory was that the poorest subject of the king might present his petition to the king for relief or for justice, and the king in turn might refer his petition to a committee of the privy council, a judicial committee of the privy council or that section of it which is appointed for the purpose of dealing with judicial matters. The result was that by reason of that provision in the statute of William the section of our code which prohibited appeals to the privy council was held bad because it was repugnant to the provisions of the British statute which permitted the appeal. So the action of this parliament in passing that statute was inoperative. That, shortly, is the last case which came before the privy council in connection with the Colonial Laws Validity Act.

So if there be a conflict or repugnance in dealing with a similar matter between the British statute and a statute passed by a legislature or parliament of a dominion, then the British statute governs because of that conflict repugnance. The conference of 1929 dealt with all these matters and recommended that a United Kingdom statute should be passed, providing that the Colonial Laws Validity Act should cease to apply to any law made by the parliament of a dominion, that no law passed by a dominion should be void or inoperative for repugnancy to United Kingdom legislation and, in positive terms, that a dominion parliament should have the power to repeal any United Kingdom Act so far as it was part of the law of the dominion. That, hon. members will observe, is to place us on an equality of status with Great Britain herself so far as legislative power is concerned, so that we might enact a statute which would repeal a statute passed by the United Kingdom parliament, the Imperial parliament so-called, if such statute was desired.

The third finding of the conference was that while the power of the United Kingdom parliament to legislate for the whole empire could not and need not be formally renounced, steps should be taken to prevent such legislation except at the express request of the dominion concerned. I need hardly point out to this chamber that no conference constituted as was the conference to which I have referred has for a single moment thought of renouncing the supremacy of the Imperial parliament, lest it be taken as a termination of the ties that bind together under the crown all the overseas dominions. So while the conference took steps to declare that only if, as and when the dominion concerned requested the Imperial parliament to act would it act in the passing of a statute. There was no occasion for the moment to take formal action to repeal or in any sense to lessen the relation between the Imperial parliament and our own with regard to the matter in question.

The fourth finding was that in the vital matter of succession to the common throne, action by all the dominion parliaments as well as the United Kingdom parliament should be required to effect a change. I suggest it is not necessary to dwell upon that more particularly. It was desirable that in legislating in the matter of succession to the common throne we should make a declaration that no change in respect to that matter should be had unless by the common action of all concerned.

Then follows the last paragraph, that express provisions should be included in the United Kingdom Act to make it clear that the new dominion powers would not confer any new power to repeal or alter the constitutional acts of the federal dominions, or to make laws on any solely provincial or state matters.

About that clause some difficulty has of course arisen. This may be the opportune time to say that under the present constitutional practice in this dominion it is only necessary for this parliament by a majority —and this parliament includes the Commons and the Senate—humbly to address His Majesty asking that legislation be enacted to bring about the passing of legislation amending the British North America Act. That has been the practice heretofore. Amendments to the British North America Act were brought about by this parliament passing an address. When that address was forwarded to Westminster the statute was passed in the terms in which the address sought to have it enacted. That raised a question of very considerable importance— May I say I am sorry to take so long in