the County of Marquette East. The law provided that a month's delay should take place between the proclamations, in order to give the fullest opportunity to the accused party to appear. COKE in his second Institutes, page 47, stated: "As the punishment under outlawry is very severe, the law has provided and takes care that no person shall be outlawed till he has had all due and proper notice of the proceedings." It was evident that the provisions of the statute in this respect had not been followed in this case, and as the law required that every step in outlawry should, on pain of nullity, be taken in strict accordance with the law, there could be no doubt that this sentence of outlawry was void. He could cite a case in which the mere change of a single letter had been held enough to upset the process of outlawry. There was another objection to the proceedings, and that was that RIEL was outlawed in the wrong court. He could only be outlawed in the County Court, but according to the record he was outlawed in the Court of Queen's Bench, sitting as a Court of Oyer and Terminer and General Gaol Delivery. The law was clear upon that point, and if it was necessary he could cite numerous authorities. He could quite understand the argument that would be raised against his position, namely, that the House had no right to constitute themselves a court of revision or appeal to sit upon this sentence of outlawry. But the House was dealing with the rights and liberties of the people, and with a constitutional question, and he held they had a right to deal with objections to this sentence of outlawry which appeared on the face of it, and which showed that it was entirely void. His position would not be misunderstood in this matter. He had voted last session for the expulsion of RIEL from this House, and he would do so again, but not upon the ground that RIEL was an outlaw, because he held that RIEL had never properly been pronounced an outlaw. If it was proposed to go behind the record, and inquire into facts not apparent on the record, then he could understand the objection that might properly be taken to such a course. But the House was asked to take action upon the record, which, upon its face, he held to be void, and therefore he could not vote for the motion of the Premier, and declare upon the strength of that record that RIEL was an outlaw.

Hon. Mr. FOURNIER contended that the whole criminal law of England, including outlawry, had been introduced into Manitoba, and therefore the objection to the course proposed by the Premier was narrowed down to the question of the legality of the proceedings that had been taken in this matter. It might perhaps be difficult with the existing organization of the courts in Manitoba to follow strictly the process laid down in the statute, because the organization of the courts in Manitoba were different from the organization of the courts in England; but that was not a matter for this House to consider. This House did not sit as a court of revision or appeal to declare whether the proper formalities of the law had been complied with or not. They had no right to look behind the judgment of the court. Whether the court was competent or not, it was not for the House to decide. If they were satisfied that outlawry existed under our law, and that a regular court of the country had decided that RIEL was an outlaw, then they must abide by the decision. He would not contest the allegations of the hon. gentleman with regard to the mode of procedure. He admitted that it was very precise and special, and that it was requisite that all the formalties should be complied with, but that was not an argument to be taken here. He had no doubt that if LOUIS RIEL engaged the hon. gentleman as counsel, and availed himself before the court of the irregularities referred to, he might, perhaps, get rid of the sentence of outlawry. No doubt the sentence of outlawry was a very severe one, but at the same time the person of RIEL was protected by law, and no one could touch him, and if he was apprehended he might take advantage of all the informalities mentioned by the hon. gentleman. But what he (Mr. FOURNIER) contended was that this House had no right to pronounce upon these irregularities, and were bound to take cognizance of the record of outlawry now before them, seeing that *prima facia* a regular and proper sentence of outlawry had been pronounced by a competent court. He might say, moreover, that this sentence was the strongest evidence that could be adduced that LOUIS