

to 200,000 pounds. There would then be reserved more than half the amount for Ontario. A large portion of this balance would be spent at Kingston, the key to Upper Canada; the rest at Toronto, Hamilton, Paris and London. It was probable that at London there would be large works in the shape of an Inland Camp. There would be various objections to this expenditure for fortifications. First, it would be said they would be unproductive works. In reply to this he would say that our country had reached that position of importance that we should follow the example of other nations and fence our country against aggression. When we made fences between ourselves and our neighbours, it was a solemn declaration to them and to the world that we intended to remain connected with Great Britain. We should remember that we had received a great deal of money from Britain; the capital of our banks, the money for the construction of our railways, etc.; and when we raised the defences of which we had spoken, it was an additional security to the British capitalists that their money was safe, and we could in future receive what more money we wanted on cheaper terms. The argument therefore against his scheme, or rather against the scheme suggested by the British Government, that it was spending money on unproductive works, would not hold good. Another objection was, that it was too heavy an expenditure for our resources. The Minister of Finance had shown that in the coming year there would be a sufficient surplus to pay interest and sinking fund on the money raised not only for these fortifications but for the Intercolonial Railway. If the money was borrowed in five annual instalments of 220,000 pounds sterling each, the charge for the first year at four per cent interest and one per cent sinking fund would be \$52,532; on the second year \$107,066; on the third year \$160,600; fourth year \$214,133; fifth and thereafter \$267,666. In 38 or 42 years, according to whether the sinking fund was invested at six per cent or five per cent, the whole amount would be entirely paid off; and he thought that such a charge on the public treasury was a very light one when we took into account the immense benefit the Dominion would derive from it. The ordinary expenditure for the Militia would not exceed \$900,000 or \$1,000,000, add to that the charge for interest and sinking fund on the fortifications loan of \$267,000 after five years, and the charge on so great a country as the Dominion of Canada for the maintenance of the Militia organization and for

[Sir G. E. Cartier (Montreal East).]

fortifications, would not be more than \$1,267,000 yearly. This was less than the charge on any other people similarly situated, but he believed that possibly the charge for militia after we had these fortifications might be less than what he had stated. Another objection was embodied in the idea that with the heavy guns of modern times, Armstrongs and others, there were no fortifications that could resist them. This idea he pronounced fallacious and unfounded. Some honourable gentleman had stated that the best fortifications Her Majesty could have for the defence of this Dominion, were to be found in the loyalty and in the hearts of its inhabitants. He admitted this furnished a most essential defence, but they were not sufficient. A nation inferior in number could not cope with a nation superior in number without fortifications. Those having such feelings should be protected so that they might live as long as possible to confront the foe. He could not admit for a moment that fortifications were useless. They were especially valuable for a nation situated as ours; for though our climate had its disadvantages, it had this advantage, that it limited the possibility of military operations against us to six months in the year. In the late war in the United States we had seen how long the immense armies under the Northern generals had been kept at bay by the fortifications of Petersburg and Richmond. By means of their fortifications the South, which could only put 500,000 men in the field, had for five years successfully resisted the North with its vastly superior resources, and which put into the field altogether 2,600,000. If Canada should be invaded, we had the power of Britain to back us, and the United States would require a large portion of their forces to defend their Atlantic seaboard and California and Oregon, which were more vulnerable by Britain than Canada was by the United States. He did not see how the United States, in the event of a war, could spare more than 150,000 men for the invasion of Canada; but with the expenses of the late war and the burdens it had entailed on them he did not believe the United States would go to war with Great Britain. (Opposition cries of "hear, hear.") It was said that in case of a war with the United States, let us meet them with flesh against flesh, but they had more flesh than we had and not content with that they were erecting fortifications besides. The honourable gentleman then referred to the history of the Crimean war to show the value of fortifica-