

**Security is  
collective**

They should not prudently be pursued in isolation from each other. It is through their mutual pursuit that we shall achieve balanced security.

We have to make all this clear to our publics. We must also explain to them just how each of our countries contributes to, and participates in, NATO's security policy. They must be reminded that our security is a collective one, and that the nuclear dialogue engages the interest of all of us. We all supported the December 1979 "two track" decision, and we have all through our membership in the Special Consultative Group played a role, under the lead of the United States, in designing the alliance's strategy for the Geneva talks.

Support for the two-track policy can of course take different forms. For our part, although intermediate-range missiles will not be stationed in Canada, we are negotiating with the United States an agreement under which unarmed *Cruise* missiles would be tested in Canada. Our purpose is to assist in the development of an improved deterrent posture for the alliance, and to contribute an additional incentive for constructive arms control negotiations.

Inevitably, arms control in one area and in one type of force is related to arms control in other areas and other types of force. I warmly welcome the recent announcement by President Reagan of United States' readiness to begin negotiations on strategic arms this summer. I applaud the United States' determination to seek radical reductions and support the emphasis on reducing destabilizing systems. I also welcome the United States' willingness to keep its allies fully informed and to consult them at every stage of the negotiations.

President Reagan's Intermediate Range Nuclear Force statement on November 18 and now his Strategic Arms Reduction Talks proposal of May 9 are up to this point the principal evidences of our collective disarmament policy, as expressed by the leading member of our alliance. We must underline them in every way possible, and communicate their seriousness as strongly as possible. For our publics, as well as for the world at large, the resulting negotiations will be a demonstration of our good faith and a test of the good faith of the Soviet Union.

The negotiating task we are setting ourselves is not an easy one. But given the choice between an arms race, and long and difficult arms control negotiations, we would all prefer the latter — as would the other side I am sure. There can be no doubt that the West, with its vast wealth and superior technology, would in the long run win any arms race with the Soviet Union. But to us, the idea of dedication to an arms race is profoundly repugnant, a mark of poverty of spirit rather than of the greatness of spirit which is characteristic of the West. The West has far more to gain than to lose from a balanced and verifiable reduction in the present level of armaments. Our dedication is, therefore, to undiminished security at lower levels of armaments, to a reduction of tensions, and to a safer and saner world for all.

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