

for instance, on collective military policies can hardly be carried out if there is disagreement on commercial and economic policies.

To take a concrete illustration: how can we expect Denmark, for instance to accept pressure to increase its NATO defence expenditures, if pressure is also successfully exerted at the same time by groups in the United States to exclude Denmark's dairy products on which she depends so much for that economic stability, which is the basis of her defence effort.

I could give another example nearer home. Canada is being urged, and quite rightly, by her colleagues in the North Atlantic coalition, including the United States, to develop defence industries and defence production. We are short of the electric power which is essential for this development, and yet are unable to secure a decision in Washington which would make new development of such power from the international rapids section of the St. Lawrence River possible.

There is a third and final aspect of this problem of international co-operation which I can merely mention; namely, the impossibility of divorcing it from the social and political ideals of the co-operating states. Co-operation is, of course, possible between states which have different forms of government. Indeed, such differences are not particularly important. What is important is that the governments and peoples concerned accept and apply the same basic principles of social and political belief and organization; that they uphold the fundamental freedoms of speech, of worship, of opinion; practice tolerance and the rule of law; support the dignity and worth of the individual and his right to immunity from persecution for holding unpopular views and for heresy.

It is difficult for co-operation to be deep and genuine between states and peoples which have not the same approach and the same devotion to these fundamental principles. It is true that in a crisis or emergency, fear of a common foe, or of a common danger can join people in a co-operative effort for their own salvation who normally would not be able or willing to work closely together. But that is an ephemeral bond of unity.

It is also true that we have this common danger now. As a result, fear has brought together states in a way, to an extent, and in a period of time which would not have been possible in more normal conditions. Fear, in fact, was one of the chief ingredients which brought about the formation of the North Atlantic association on its present broad basis of membership. Something more than fear will have to keep it going.

Fear and crisis, then provide no permanent or solid foundation for international co-operation or for the development of sound international organization. We must have something stronger and more enduring than that. That is why in NATO we are trying to build up an association which is better and deeper than a military alliance; one which will survive the crisis which, in the first instance, may have brought it into existence.