

increase confidence and stability.

More ambitious arms control options might include pushing New Delhi and Islamabad to ratify the CTBT and develop a FMCT. Similarly, given the destabilizing impact of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles between neighbours, it might be worthwhile to seek Chinese, Indian and Pakistani re-dedication to the principles of the MTCR – and to develop disincentives.

There may be some flexibility to be found in adjusting the nuclear postures adopted by both states. Both India and Pakistan, as demonstrated by some of the draft nuclear doctrine recently published, are grappling with employment and deployment. These new doctrines do away with what has been described *inter alia* as "ambiguous deterrence" - India's refusal, despite the 1974 PNE, to confirm or deny whether it had weaponized and deployed nuclear weapons. This proved remarkably stable, despite repeated conventional clashes between India and Pakistan; regrettably, the 1998 tests effectively eliminated ambiguity, and may have put paid to any possibility of returning to the *statu quo ante*. That said, there is still some hope for encouraging both states to commit to a policy of "non-weaponized deterrence", in which neither state would deploy, stockpile or even assemble a nuclear arsenal. This would serve to increase decision-making time in a crisis to days or even weeks, further stabilizing the regional nuclear balance without eliminating the ability of either India or Pakistan to respond in short order to an emerging threat. As a corollary, with no robust early-warning or command, control and communications systems for nuclear weapons, non-weaponized deterrence may prove to be the safest policy option in a region where the first false alarm could well be the last.

In addition to these options, there are a number of more ambitious initiatives that probably do not have any prospect of near- or even mid-term success. These include encouraging both New Delhi and Islamabad to adopt a nuclear "freeze"; to reverse the growth of arsenals and "roll back" the nuclear capability of both states; to seek nuclear disarmament in the Sub-continent; and to accede to the NPT as non-NWS. While these are laudable goals, only the first has even the slightest prospect of near-term success, and the second could probably not be pushed with any credibility by the Permanent Five until these states have made more significant cuts to their nuclear forces. Finally, nuclear disarmament and NPT accession, for India in any case (and therefore, for Pakistan), will continue to be a non-starter until the Permanent Five begin talking disarmament as well. This was not true in South America but is surely so in South Asia.

Track II

Non-governmental solutions were not very present in the Argentine-Brazilian nuclear story. As so much else in Latin American history, it was state-to-state relations which were vastly more important. Nonetheless, there was a context so favourable for increased contact and cooperation between Brazil and Argentina as the years went on that it would be wrong not to mention Track II. All manner of business, cultural and people-to-people contacts were being established between Brazil and Argentina as the post-war years evolved. Tourism between the two countries had become