

conditions, that is:

- (1) The ban on SDI research. This is a complex question, now clearly the subject of continuing debate at Geneva. "Research" has become an intricate element in the debate about the ABM Treaty and may yet prove an insurmountable obstacle to arms reductions, but it does not directly affect the arguments for or against force reductions which we discuss below.
- (2) The question of British and French nuclear forces. Somewhat differing proposals have emerged on this, but the following is clear. The British and French have been invited to discuss their forces with the Soviets, but the Soviets are not necessarily seeking to negotiate European reductions in a separate framework. Since the Americans cannot formally put the British and French forces on the table in Geneva, there is not yet an accepted framework in which the full range of the theatre issues can be addressed. On the other hand, both sides have tabled proposals on US-Soviet missiles in Europe which indicate the potential for an agreement which does not immediately encompass British and French forces. In this last regard, the US proposal makes no reference to the British and French, while the Soviet proposal requires that the British and French not "build up" their forces in the interim period.

Both of these points indicate that although there is much that is new in the Soviet proposal, there is also a repetition of some existing positions which have so far not led to fruitful negotiations (This is intended as a caution, not necessarily as criticism of the Soviet Union, since there is much to be said on both sides of the LRINF issue, and, particularly, on the need for an accommodation concerning British and French forces).

With these reservations, the calculations and analysis below seek to answer the following questions:

- A. What would be the effect of the proposed reductions (50% on launchers,