

fighting vehicles including self-propelled guns and personnel carriers as well as attack aircraft and fighter interceptors can effectively prosecute both offensive and defensive functions. This makes the exclusive limitation of offensive capabilities (a frequent consideration of Constraint Measures) difficult (but not impossible) and, as a consequence, limits what can be achieved through Inspection Measures. Put simply, it is difficult to identify a purely offensive capability to constrain and therefore to inspect. This technical ambiguity is compounded by the doctrinal preferences of some states for "offensive defences". Here it is worth noting that the Soviet Union, the United States, and the Federal Republic of Germany are all examples of states that claim, to different degrees, to see great merit in defences that possess an offensive or counter-offensive capability. Intentions – a primary focus for CBMs – become extremely difficult to infer purely on the basis of such evidence. *Because of these compound ambiguities, there isn't a great deal of room for building confidence purely on the basis of the presence or absence of capabilities. Inspections of the ambiguous that merely confirm its inherent ambiguity cannot create confidence.* This effectively limits the degree of confidence that can be produced or confirmed through inspections *per se* because the willingness of states to permit inspections and on-site monitoring *may not lead to reduced fears about aggressive intentions.*

None of this is meant to deny the utility of CBMs based on Inspection Measures. *Assuming that clear-cut criteria can be established within Constraint Measures, Inspection Measures can lead to enhanced confidence.* The problem resides in defining those criteria. It is within discussions of those criteria and Constraint Measures more generally that evidence of the ethnocentric and psychologically unsophisticated character of the Confidence-Building literature begins to emerge. We will see this again in the last category of this chapter. The problem itself is discussed at some length in Chapter Seven.

*Non-Interference Measures*

These proposals are based on existing understandings developed during the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. A crucial feature of the SALT agreements was the acknowledged reliance upon National Technical Means of verification to confirm compliance with the numerous pro-

visions of the agreements. Equally important was the explicit commitment not to interfere with the ability of other states to verify compliance. Although interpretations of what this entails have been rather narrow at times (the Soviet use of encrypted flight test data that they regard as unnecessary for verification of SALT limitations is a good example), the basic principle is now well established. Virtually all proposals that rely upon verification in any way, directly or indirectly, now include non-interference clauses. Within the perspective developed in this study, it is the agreement not to interfere that constitutes the Confidence-Building Measure. Any CBM that includes prohibitions or restrictions on observable activities or capabilities must include Non-interference Measures.

*Behavioural or Tension-Reducing Measures*

These are difficult measures to categorize, hence their identification as a separate type. The main thrust of these measures is to constrain or forbid, by mutual agreement, certain types of military activity that are "needlessly aggressive" or provocative (as opposed to merely "threatening"). The sort of military activity considered here is generally small scale and "war-like" in character. It is very belligerent behaviour that could easily precipitate aggressive countermeasures and lead to crisis escalation or unintended war. The classic illustration of this sort of measure is the 1972 "Agreement Between the USA and the USSR on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas." Another useful illustration is the proposal that "hunter-killer" submarines and other Anti-Submarine Warfare platforms be forbidden to trail ballistic missile submarines on patrol. The intention of these measures is to constrain certain types of (often gratuitous) military activity that could trigger serious apprehensions and lead to unintended crises. This category of measure could also be included within the "Constraint Measures" category as a separate type of constraint undertaking.

*Constraint Measures*

In practice, Constraint Measures would almost always be associated with Inspection Measures. Their full effectiveness depends upon this association. It is, of course, possible to imagine at least some tangible Constraint Measures being undertaken without specific provisions for on- or over-site inspection but

