

hindrance from Moscow. And the repressive regimes in East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Romania are criticized by Moscow for their adherence to the old, cruel ways.

A new attitude has been brought to international organizations and multilateral cooperation. Part of the reason the UN system has been reinvigorated is that there is a new Soviet acceptance of its relevance and utility.

And in those areas most fundamental to Western security — arms control and other aspects of the East-West relationship — we have seen a remarkable transformation. Western proposals previously rejected as untenable are now seized by Moscow and advanced as their own.

That happened when Mr. Gorbachev and President Reagan signed this historic agreement which eliminated a whole class of nuclear weapons.

It is reflected in the Soviet Union reversing the previous policy to embrace other Western arms control proposals — on a chemical weapons ban and on asymmetric force reductions in Europe.

Real compromise, real give and take, the beginnings of acceptance of Western concepts of stability and confidence-building: that has become more the rule and less the exception.

Naturally, Mr. Gorbachev still seeks to preserve national advantage and advances some proposals whose primary intent is to cause domestic political problems for Western governments. But there is a fundamental dynamic to the new Soviet attitude which is refreshingly flexible, even reasonable in its tone and content. Rather than strangers playing games according to different rules, using different concepts, and seeking different ends, one now has the sense of a traditional negotiating process between players who accept the rules, share the concepts and know where the areas of compromise lie. One can see this in the new negotiations on conventional forces in Europe, as well as in nuclear arms control.

Now, what should our attitude in the West be to all of this?

And what stake and interests do we as *Canadians* have in this process?

To me, the most fundamental question for the West is this: Is it in our interest to see Mr. Gorbachev succeed? From this, everything else follows.

To me, the unequivocal answer is 'yes.'

Why should we fear a more prosperous and free Soviet society? Are the processes of social and economic development which turned Western societies away from war and toward diplomacy invalid for the USSR and Eastern Europe? Is the Soviet leadership incapable of seeing the advantages of peace, and the costs of war? Just as within the West, the webs of trade and prosperity act as a damper on conflict, is it not possible to envisage a similar fabric between East and West? And should we not strive to bring that to pass?

If we are suspicious of Mr. Gorbachev; if we deride the pace of his reforms or the degree of his success; if we shun opportunities for mutual advantage, then we must ask ourselves some troubling questions.

Canada has much to offer

Would the alternative be better?

Do we wish to see the Old Guard returned?

Despite what we've been saying for years, do we really prefer Stalinist repression, inefficiency and imperialism?

Are we so fearful of change that we seek a retreat to the past?

The answer to all these questions is surely 'no.'

Now, this of course does not mean we slide into escapist dreams or flights of idealism divorced from reality.

We cannot forget, after all, that the Soviet military remains enormous, enjoying tremendous numerical advantages over our own forces in Europe.

Again, the obstacles Mikhail Gorbachev faces internally are major ones. His eventual success cannot be taken for granted.

We must remain prudent, always careful to safeguard our interests and advance our values.

The Soviet Union has no tradition as do we of democratic institutions or individual liberties.

In any negotiations with the Soviets, we must bargain hard.

And we must, above all, continue to be guided by that combination of defence and dialogue which has served the NATO Alliance so well for 40 years, which helped create the incentive for Mr. Gorbachev's reforms.

But it is not a choice between 'our' interest and 'theirs'; between dialogue and silence; between their future and ours.

Canada and the West have a big stake in Mr. Gorbachev's success.

We must encourage his reforms. We must applaud his efforts, while asking for more. We must be patient. We must state our support for his domestic goals clearly and unequivocally. We must help the Soviet citizen develop that sense of self-confidence so central to the success of reform.

How does Canada fit in to all of this?

In one sense, we have no 'special' interest. We are a country like others which seeks peace, strives for stability and searches for new avenues of cooperation. But we also have much that *is* special. We are the next-door neighbour to the Soviet Union, a Northern country, an Arctic nation. We too have a resource-based economy, and skill and experience in developing it. We share environmental concerns and problems. We are a multicultural society that works — and that has direct family connections to the East — one in ten Canadians are from Russian or Eastern European backgrounds. And we have much to offer a Soviet Union which seeks Western know-how and experience as it enters a new economic era.

I believe we must capitalize on this commonality of situation, this mutuality of interest — both out of our narrow national interest and a recognition of the