that even in the exercise of the common law jurisdiction vested in the High Court by the Judicature Act an injunction could not be granted to restrain an act which was not illegal. The judgment of Romer, J., dismissing the action was restored.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT—EXCESS OF AUTHORITY OF AGENT—PRINCIPAL, LIABILITY OF, FOR UNAUTHORIZED ACT OF AGENT—AUTHORITY TO PLEDGE FOR A PARTICULAR SUM—FORGERY—REDEMPTION.

Brocklesby v. *Temperance Building Society*, (1895) A.C. 173; 11 R. May 1, which, in the Court of Appeal, (1893) 3 Ch. 130, was noted *ante* vol. 29, p. 713, has been affirmed by the House of Lords (Lord Herschell, L.C., and Lords Watson, Macnaghten, and Morris), following *Perry-Herrick* v. *Attwood*, 2 DeG. & J. 21. It may be remembered that the question in controversy was whether a principal who had entrusted an agent with securities and instructed him to pledge them in order to raise a certain sum could, in a redemption action, be required to pay as the price of a redemption a much larger sum which the agent had fraudulently raised on the securities and diverted to his own use, the lender having acted *bona fide*, and in ignorance of the limitation of the agent's authority. Their lordships agreed with the Court of Appeal in deciding the question in the affirmative, even though the agent had been guilty of fraud and forgery in carrying out the transaction.

WILL—DIRECTION TO ACCUMULATE INCOME—ACCUMULATION.

Wharton v. *Masterman*, (1895) A.C. 186; 11 R. May 11, is a decision of the House of Lords affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeal in *Harbin* v. *Masterman*, (1894) 2 Ch. 184 (noted *ante* vol. 30, p. 629). By the way, what an absurd and inconvenient practice it is to metamorphose in this way the name of a case when it goes to the Supreme Court or the House of Lords! It appears to us that if, in addition to the rearrangement of the parties required by the practice of the Supreme Court and Privy Council, the short style of the cause as originally entitled were always placed at the head, a case might then be traced through the reports in all its stages without any change of name. Thus an action of *Jones* v. *Smith* would not be able to become *Smith* v. *Tompkins* in the Supreme Court, or *Tompkins* v. *Jacobs* in the Privy Council, as it is apt to do at present. Their lordships