the universal headgear of gentlemen. Its survival at the Bar is simply one of the numerous instances of the survival of what was formerly a portion of the ordinary attire in distinctively official costume. For instance, till about fifty years ago, the bishops of the English and Irish Churches always wore wigs like the bobwigs of barristers, both in their canonical and ordinary attire. The robes of the Speaker of the House of Commons are identical with the robes of the Master of the Rolls simply from the fact that the post of Master of the Rolls was frequently held in conjunction with that of the Speaker of the House of Commons. The phrase 'gentlemen of the long robe,' which is still sometimes heard in Parliamentary proceedings as a description of members of the Bar in the House of Commons, arose from the fact that in former times it was not unusual for a member of the House of Commons to walk across Westminster Hall from the Courts to the House of Commons and enter it attired in wig and gown.

VACATION ELOQUENCE.—The tedium of the Vacation Court on Tuesday was pleasantly relieved by an all too brief incident in which Mr. Oswald, Q.C., M.P., chiefly figured. He had pressed his point on Mr. Justice Mathew with plusquam-Oswaldian persistence till at last the judge repeated several times that he would hear him no longer. 'My lord,' said Mr. Oswald as a parting shot, 'in vacation counsel is very often placed in a very difficult position.' 'And so is the judge sometimes,' said Mr. Justice Mathew, amid general laughter. 'You can't score off Mathew,' somebody observed.—*Pall Mall Gazette.*

TESTIMONY BY THE JUDGE.—The curious case of *Rogers* v. *The State*, Supreme Court of Arkansas (1894), 29 South-Western Rep. 894, is mentioned in the *University Law Review*. On an indictment for murder, the prosecution, desiring to prove that the defendant had filed a motion for discontinuance at a former trial on account of the absence of material witnesses, called the trial judge, presiding at the present trial, as witness against the prisoner, and he testified to those circumstances. Afterwards, being of opinion that the evidence was incompetent, he excluded the testimony which he had given as a witness. The Appellate Court held that, although no partiality or wrong intention was shown, this was an error, especially since, under the constitution of the State forbidding judges to charge on a question of fact, it amounted to an expression of opinion; and the error was fatal to the verdict.