

them to Soviet aims by demonstrating as far as possible that the Soviet Union is the natural friend and ally of such movements. And, finally, Moscow seeks to ensure its own security through the pursuit of detente and the maintenance, at a minimum, of strategic parity with the United States. In this view, detente is a sort of insurance against nuclear war. But detente is specific to Europe and does not at all rule out ideological rivalry and even military intervention in the Third World, where no defined status quo exists. Nor does strategic parity with the United States exclude the ability to challenge American power and influence in specific circumstances, particularly where the U.S. can be denied regional associates or allies.

We see that instability and upheaval have become characteristics of the Third World at a time when the importance of the developing countries in the East-West context is increasing and also when the ability of the United States to play the role of global policeman is in decline. Afghanistan is only the latest and most striking example of this combination of trends. It illustrates the need for an overall, long-term western concept capable of dealing not only with Soviet policy but also with the circumstances which offer the Soviet Union opportunities to exploit. It also illustrates the degree to which the local and internal preoccupations of Third World countries have prevented them from even recognizing, let alone tackling the broader tasks of international co-operation and collective security. This will no doubt continue to be the case as long as regional problems in the Middle East and elsewhere remain unresolved. The achievement of majority rule in independent Zimbabwe gives ground for cautious hope in southern Africa. It seems a coherent Western policy between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean will remain impossible as long as the Arab-Israeli quarrel festers.

These developments are not entirely new, of course; they have been taking shape for years. However, they have underlined once again the fact of our global interdependence. We are all in the same boat in this shrinking world of ours. Sooner or later (and I hope it is sooner) we will have to consider seriously the practical implications of interdependence to our way of life and try again to find answers to some of the most pressing and persistent questions of our times.

One of these is how we are to adapt our security policy to an era of detente. The nuclear stalemate and the agreements between the U.S. and the Soviet Union on strategic arms limitations have certainly increased the inhibitions on the use of military force by the two superpowers and reduced the danger of nuclear war. They have not eliminated the risk of conflict or pressure below the nuclear threshold, however. At the same time the success of NATO in deterring aggression and promoting detente has reduced the perception of the threat and created confusion about the continued

need for defence. Both sides have agreed that there is no alternative to detente (in the sense of no general war) but each side has a very different idea of what detente really means. For the West it means a more open relationship in a spirit of live and let live. But the Soviets want to have their cake and eat it too, promoting greater co-operation between states so as to increase access to Western markets and technology, while retaining rigid controls over the movement of people and information, maintaining the ideological conflict and making mischief in the Third World.

Deterrent capability

To answer this question satisfactorily we will have to find the right mix of detente and defence. The only sensible approach is to maintain, on the one hand, a sufficient deterrent capability, both conventional and nuclear, until we can negotiate with the Warsaw Pact a reduction in the level of forces in Europe; and on the other hand, to insist that the detente process must provide for an easing of relations between people as well as between states. We must formulate policies designed not merely to reduce East-West relations in the short term but to create more lasting conditions of stability and predictability based on balance and dialogue. We must also explain clearly and repeatedly to the public what we are doing. Experience shows (as in the matter of medium-range missiles in Europe) that it may sometimes be necessary to forego some easing of tension in the short run in order to achieve a more balanced, stable and healthy relationship in the long run.

Another question is how we should deal with the interaction between the East-West division and the North-South cleavage. Is detente divisible? Can we afford to see the world divided into a zone of detente, where peaceful coexistence reigns, at least for the time being, and a zone of unbridled rivalry, where the USSR takes advantage of every opportunity to spread its influence by any means?

Related to this is the question of how we are to solve the new global problems of energy, food resource management and the environment. These are problems which are of a medium and long term structural nature and for which there are not quick answers. We therefore need to approach them not as isolated North-South issues but as part of a world-wide attack on structural problems which we need to overcome for our own future. Their solution depends not primarily on military factors but on economic, technological and other such 'functional' factors but which, are nevertheless of extraordinary significance for our security. They are also problems which obviously can be solved only on a global scale, either in the United Nations (as in the case of the Law of the Sea) or by other international machinery, and this must involve working with the developing countries of the Third World. This means in turn finding more lasting forms of co-operation with those countries which will take account