

ever as between a contribution of money or ships and the construction of fleet units.

A fleet unit consists of 1 armoured cruiser ("Dreadnought" type); 3 unarmoured cruisers ("Bristol" type); 6 destroyers; 3 submarines. The fact that in speaking of the aid it is desirable should be provided, the section makes use of the words "should include" in referring to the largest and strongest ships of war, would almost seem to imply that the Admiralty had in mind, not the "exclusive" presentation of Dreadnoughts, but rather the construction of fleet units, which would necessarily "include" these largest and strongest ships of war.

But there is something more significant than this in the section as it is worded, and the wording clearly is not without design. It will be noticed that the Admiralty does not say that under all circumstances it is desirable that the aid to be given should take the form here mentioned, but that in answer to a specific question which is specifically limited in its nature, the Admiralty gives the answer therein contained.

It is necessary at this point to consider what was in Mr. Borden's mind when he went to England, and what it was which gave rise to the question which he put to the Admiralty, and to which he requested an answer. Because of his compromise with the Nationalists, Mr. Borden was pledged not to adopt a permanent policy without appealing to the people. On the other hand, to satisfy the jingoes, he was obliged to do something. He was not anxious to make an appeal to the people and, therefore, when he went to England, he did not go with a view of trying to arrange a permanent policy, but rather to find a means of escape from one. He went to England to find or create an emergency which might help him out of his own difficulties. The real emergency was not any danger to British Supremacy on the high seas, but the situation as it had developed in his own cabinet, and that is the emergency which his present proposals are intended to meet.

What had Mr. Borden reason to believe would be the view of the Admiralty when he went to England? What possible view could he have expected them to have other than the one to which public expression had so freely and constantly been given? He knew very well that to ask, without any restriction one way or the other, what it was best to do in the matter of naval defence, the reply of the First Lord of the Admiralty would have been to lay special emphasis on what is contained in his own speech at the Shipwright's Dinner and which is in accord with the purpose of the unanimous resolution of March, 1909, and advise the bringing to completion, as soon as this could reasonably be effected, the fleet units on the Atlantic and Pacific in accordance with the permanent policy already decided upon.

But how different was Mr. Borden's action from that which the Admiralty and the British Government had reason to expect! No sooner had Mr. Borden landed in England than he made the public pronouncement that "any great Dominion undertaking to share upon a permanent basis in the sea defence of the Empire must have some voice in the policy which shapes the issue of war