

cannot but conclude that were it more generally and thoroughly understood it would prove fatal to Arminian and Pelagian principles.

It has been said, by way of objection, that we place the inability of man wholly in the *WILL*, whereas it ought to be extended to the understanding and affections, these being equally depraved as the other—or words to that effect. To this we reply,

1. If by placing the inability in the will, we are understood as excluding the other powers of the soul, we are misunderstood. We do not suppose men's inability to lie in their will in distinction from their understanding and affections; but in distinction from the want of natural powers. We mean to include, under the terms moral inability, all sinful blindness of mind, hardness of heart, and irregularity of the passions, as well as slothfulness, and rebellion in the will. In a word, all that depravity that diffuses itself throughout, and infects the whole soul, let it be in what power it may, that is it which we suppose constitutes man's inability to do the will of God.

2. If we have used the term *will*, and *inability of will* oftener than other terms, it is partly because the will is a leading power of the soul, and so we use a part for the whole;—and partly because whatever other powers are infected by sin, all is voluntary. If men's inability lies partly in blindness of mind, as we readily grant, still that blindness is voluntary; for *they refuse to know me saith the Lord*, and are *willingly ignorant*. So far, indeed, as ignorance may arise from a want of the means of knowledge, or natural ability to use them, so far we allow it is innocent; but that is not the case

though it adds to the glory and excellency of it; and therefore may, and may not be with it, without any violation to, or destruction of the *natural* liberty of the will.—Cause of Truth, p. 1. No. 5.